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Earnings volatility—variability over time in a worker’s earnings—is inter-
esting for its potential welfare consequences and as a labor market outcome.
In the presence of liquidity constraints, households may not be able to smooth
consumption when faced with volatile earnings. And rising earnings volatility
may indicate that workers are changing jobs more often or that implicit con-
tracts governing compensation within jobs are smoothing pay less, to name
two possibilities. This dissertation shows that earnings volatility has increased
in the U.S., and assesses, for a specific concept and measure of volatility, the
reasons for the increase.
After an introduction, Chapter 2 introduces my preferred volatility mea-
sure, the volatility of residual earnings after estimating life cycle earnings pro-
files. Previous literature covers an array of concepts and measures of volatility.
I outline differences among these approaches and argue that the primary mo-
tivation for studying volatility—potential welfare losses—has implications for
the specification of the life cycle profiles and measures of earnings volatility.
Chapter 3 describes the data I use, a sample of male heads of household
from the PSID. In Chapter 4, I show that earnings volatility has increased in
the U.S., and that about 70 percent of the increase is explained by volatility
of wages rather than hours worked. I describe how earnings volatility differs
across groups, and show that it has increased among almost all groups. Finally,
I consider whether these findings depend on some measurement choices. All
measures show increasing earnings volatility in the U.S., but the amount of
the increase and comparisons of volatility across groups are often sensitive to
methodological choices.
Chapter 5 addresses why earnings volatility has increased in the U.S. I de-
velop a decomposition approach to attribute changes in economy-wide volatil-
ity to various factors. I create a demand shock index that measures work-
ers’ predicted exposure to labor demand shocks, using national changes in the
occupation-industry distribution of hours worked. My major finding is that
larger or more frequent labor demand shocks explain about half of the increase
in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is about the meaning and measurement of earnings volatil-
ity, which is variability over time in a worker’s earnings or some component
of those earnings, and about the recent increase in earnings volatility among
men in the U.S. In this introductory chapter, I do three things. First, I describe
the motivation for studying earnings volatility. Second, I discuss the questions
that I answer in this dissertation. Finally, I present a summary of my findings.
1.1 Motivation
The primary motivation for studying earnings volatility is that the welfare of
individuals and households is reduced if they are not able to smooth con-
sumption in the face of volatile income. Researchers frequently reference this
motivation. For example, Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Gorbachev (2011)
study the link between earnings volatility and household consumption volatil-
ity. Studies of earnings volatility that mention as motivation risk, uncertainty,
or welfare losses through consumption volatility include Shin and Solon (2011),
Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger (2011), Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2012), and
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012).
The increase since the 1970s in earnings volatility among men in the U.S.
was first documented by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) and has continued since
then, as I show in chapter 4. This increase has sparked concern that the welfare
losses associated with volatility are also growing. This does not have to be the
case: government transfers or spouse’s labor earnings, for example, could keep
the volatility of household income from rising, or improvements in financial
products or access to the financial system could prevent consumption volatility
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from rising even if households’ income volatility increased.
However, there are reasons to believe that higher earnings volatility would,
in fact, lead to more consumption volatility. Gruber (1997) reports that house-
hold food consumption drops by 7 percent on average upon job loss by male
household heads, and by much more for workers eligible for less generous un-
employment insurance benefits. For low-asset households, credit cards are one
option for replacing lost income, but credit limits and high interest rates limit
the extent to which this method can be used to smooth consumption. Sullivan
(2008) finds that low-asset households—those in the second and third deciles
of the asset distribution—use credit cards to replace 11.5 to 13.4 cents of each
dollar of earnings lost due to unemployment. Very low-asset households—
those in the bottom decile of the asset distribution—do not increase credit card
borrowing in response to unemployment shocks, likely because they have very
limited access to credit.
There is also direct evidence that household consumption volatility has in-
creased in the U.S. over the same time period as the increase in earnings volatil-
ity documented in previous literature and in this dissertation. Dynarski and
Gruber (1997) found that household consumption volatility rose as earnings
volatility of household heads increased between 1970 and 1991. Gorbachev
(2011) also documents rising consumption volatility, and finds a link between
volatility of earnings and volatility of food consumption that is particularly
strong among low-income households. She calculates that by 2004, “an average
household would be willing to sacrifice 4.15 percent of its annual nondurable
consumption to reduce consumption risk back to where it was in 1971.”
A secondary motivation for studying earnings volatility is to learn about
labor markets. Earnings volatility is inherently interesting because it reflects,
2
for example, pay setting within jobs and the consequences of job change. Also,
the persistent increase in earnings volatility suggests ongoing or permanent
changes in the U.S. labor market. For these reasons, Moffitt and Gottschalk
(2002) called rising volatility “one of the more puzzling aspects” of recent labor
market trends. The empirical part of this dissertation addresses this puzzle in
part by studying labor demand, job change, and earnings variability within
jobs.
1.2 Questions
What is earnings volatility?
Before studying a phenomenon empirically, it is good to be clear about con-
cepts and measures of that phenomenon. This is especially important for re-
search on earnings volatility. Previous studies of volatility begin with a mea-
sure, sometimes discuss advantages and disadvantages of the chosen measure,
then move to the empirics. But without considering underlying concepts, or at
least comparing multiple measures, it is impossible to know whether one mea-
sure is more appropriate than another. Nevertheless, researchers often com-
pare results across different measures of volatility, implicitly treating earnings
volatility as a single concept. Therefore, my first task is to identify the concep-
tual differences among measures of volatility that have been used in previous
research.
How should earnings volatility be measured?
All or almost all of the measures I discuss seem to be reasonable ways to quan-
tify the variability of earnings, but there are many differences among them, and
3
authors have arrived at different conclusions depending on which measure is
used. Which measures should be preferred? To make progress on this issue, I
identify some methodological recommendations that are consequences of the
fact that risk is the primary motivation for studying volatility.
How has earnings volatility changed over time, and how does it differ across
workers?
My primary empirical question is why earnings volatility has increased over
time. Before addressing that issue, I first establish that volatility has, in fact,
increased among men in the U.S. Another empirical issue, secondary in interest
but instrumental in answering the question of why volatility increased, is how
volatility differs across workers.
How important are some methodological choices for these empirical results?
I identify conceptual differences among measures of volatility and make some
methodological recommendations for studying volatility. How important are
these methodological choices for the different results obtained by previous re-
searchers? I show how important these issues are within a single sample from
a single data source. Of course, different data sources and sample restrictions
could also explain the varying results found in previous research.
Why did earnings volatility increase?
After identifying a conceptual basis for my preferred measure of volatility, and
after establishing that volatility has increased over time in my sample, I turn
to the question of why earnings volatility increased. To answer this, I use a
decomposition approach that makes use of differences in earnings volatility
4
across workers, along with changes in worker characteristics over time.
1.3 Summary of findings
I begin in chapter 2 by introducing my preferred method of measuring earn-
ings volatility. My approach is to first estimate life cycle earnings profiles, then
measure the variability over time of workers’ residuals from these profiles. The
life cycle profiles I specify are somewhat different from the previous literature
on earnings volatility, but the measure I apply to the residuals is what Moffitt
and Gottschalk (2012) call the window averaging approach: a worker’s volatil-
ity in a given year is the variance of the worker’s residual log earnings during
a nine-year window centered on that year. Economy-wide earnings volatility
is the mean of workers’ earnings volatilities for a given year.
The rest of chapter 2 is concerned with the first two questions listed above.
First, I identify multiple concepts of earnings volatility. The most important
distinction is what component of earnings is used when measuring the vari-
ability of earnings: earnings or log earnings (volatility of total earnings), residual
log earnings from life cycle profiles (volatility of residual earnings), or the tran-
sitory as opposed to permanent component of residual earnings (volatility of
transitory earnings).
Second, I argue that the risk motivation for studying earnings volatility
implies that volatility of residual earnings, rather than volatility of total earn-
ings or transitory earnings, is the most salient volatility concept, and that this
motivation has implications for the measurement of the volatility of residual
earnings. Life cycle earnings profiles should account for earnings changes that
workers likely anticipate, but should leave unanticipated changes to contribute
to measured earnings volatility. Therefore, the life cycle profiles should not ab-
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sorb macroeconomic shocks, which are unlikely to be anticipated by workers,
but should absorb worker-specific earnings trends, which recent research sug-
gests are mostly anticipated. Also, the welfare loss of interest implies volatility
measures should be based on squared changes or variances rather than on
absolute changes or standard deviations.
After describing in chapter 3 the data that I use, I show in chapter 4 that
under my preferred measure of earnings volatility, economy-wide volatility
increased by over 70 percent among a sample of male heads of household in the
PSID. This finding is robust to changing the length of the window over which
workers’ earnings volatility is computed, to including workers who do not have
earnings observations for each time period in the window, and to dropping
earnings volatility observations based on any imputed values of earnings. Most
of the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility can be attributed to rising
volatility of hourly wages, rather than rising volatility of hours worked.
I also describe how earnings volatility differs across workers. There are sig-
nificant differences in earnings volatility across age groups, marital status, and
many other categories, but no significant differences across education groups
or by union membership. These descriptive exercises are useful in formulating
theories about why economy-wide earnings volatility increased. For example,
highly educated workers do not have significantly more earnings volatility than
workers with little education, so a shift in the composition of the labor force
toward more educated workers will not be empirically important, in an ac-
counting sense, in explaining rising economy-wide earnings volatility. I show
that mean earnings volatility has increased over time within almost all groups,
no matter how the sample is partitioned. This suggests that compositional
changes cannot explain the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility over
6
time.
I show that volatility of residual earnings is largest among the lowest earn-
ings quintile, and that from 1975 to 2005, earnings volatility rose more in the
lowest earnings quintile than in any other quintile. In a simple exercise to
demonstrate how the welfare losses from earnings volatility differ across earn-
ings quintiles, I show that a worker in the highest earnings quintile would pay
about 1 percent of earnings to eliminate volatility of residual earnings in 1975
and a little over 2 percent in 2005, but a worker in the lowest earnings quintile
would pay about 3 percent in 1975 and almost 6 percent in 2005.
The increase in economy-wide volatility of residual earnings could be due
to factors associated with job change—more frequent job change, more earn-
ings volatility for a given rate of job change, or both—or factors associated with
pay setting within jobs. I find that the rate of job change in my sample actu-
ally decreased slightly over time. The composition of job changes shifted to-
ward more voluntary changes rather than involuntary changes, and voluntary
changes are associated with less earnings volatility than involuntary changes.
Therefore, job change is unlikely to have strong explanatory power as a proxi-
mate cause of economy-wide volatility of residual earnings. To look for clues as
to how changes in pay setting within jobs might have affected earnings volatil-
ity, I look at the level and change over time of volatility of residual earnings
in single-digit occupation and industry categories, both for all workers and for
job stayers only. There is no clear pattern to the sector-specific increases in
earnings volatility.
The final section of chapter 4 examines the empirical importance of the
methodological recommendations made in chapter 2. I find that measuring
volatility of residual earnings rather than volatility of total earnings does not
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change the time series of economy-wide earnings volatility. Allowing aggre-
gate shocks to contribute to measured earnings volatility also does not change
economy-wide earnings volatility. Including worker-specific earnings trends
in life cycle profiles has a modest effect on the degree to which economy-wide
earnings volatility increases over time, and the functional form of the earnings
volatility measure has a large influence on the size of the increase over time in
economy-wide earnings volatility. All of the methodological recommendations
have noticeable effects on cross-worker comparisons of earnings volatility, such
as comparing the volatility of job changers to the volatility of job stayers.
Chapter 5 addresses my final question: why has economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings, by my preferred measure, increased in the U.S.? It provides
the most extensive empirical analysis of this issue to date, using worker-level
data; previous papers addressing this topic use calibration exercises or unrep-
resentative firm-level data. I develop a decomposition approach to attribute
the change over time in economy-wide volatility to various factors.
I find that larger or more frequent shocks to labor demand are the strongest
explanation for the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility. A demand
shock index, which predicts workers’ exposure to labor demand shocks on the
basis of changes in the national employment distribution across occupation-
industry sectors, has risen over time and accounts for about half of the increase
in economy-wide earnings volatility. This finding is robust to the inclusion of
a rich set of controls and to various ways of constructing the demand shock in-
dex. Worker and job characteristics, such as education, experience, occupation,
and union membership, explain close to none of the increase in economy-wide
earnings volatility.
I also test existing explanations for rising economy-wide earnings volatil-
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ity and find that these theories explain very little of the increase in volatility.
In particular, because of previous research on the relationship between ris-
ing earnings volatility and job and occupation mobility, I assess the role of
job change and occupation change in the increase in economy-wide earnings
volatility. Job change is associated with spikes in a worker’s earnings volatility,
but the incidence of job change did not increase over time in my sample, so
patterns of job change predict no increase over time in economy-wide earnings
volatility. This is confirmed when using job, occupation, or industry tenure
as explanatory variables instead of job change. Even though workers with low
tenure have higher earnings volatility—possibly because they are accumulating
specific human capital at a faster rate—the incidence of low tenure has not in-
creased. Finally, I find no support for the possibility that demand shocks affect
earnings volatility only through job change, which might cause the earnings
volatility consequences of job change to increase even if the rate of job change
does not increase.
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CHAPTER 2
MEASURING EARNINGS VOLATILITY
This chapter begins by introducing my preferred method of measuring
earnings volatility in section 2.1. I then discuss the literature on earnings
volatility in two separate sections. In section 2.2, I focus on the conceptual
differences among some previous approaches. This includes both the subset
of earnings that are of interest—total earnings, residual earnings from a life
cycle earnings profile, or the transitory, as opposed to permanent, component
of residual earnings—and the measure used to quantify earnings variability.
In section 2.3, I argue that measurement choices should be informed by the
fact that risk is the primary motivation for studying earnings volatility. This
has implications for the type of earnings volatility that is most relevant; for
the estimation of life cycle earnings profiles, which is a preliminary step in
measuring the volatility of residual earnings or transitory earnings; and for the
functional form of the earnings volatility measure.
2.1 My preferred measure
The primary results in this dissertation are based on a measure of the volatility
of residual earnings, which is the variability of residuals from a life cycle earn-
ings profile. This method avoids counting as volatility earnings changes that
are explained by life cycle dynamics, on the assumption that these changes are
generally anticipated by workers and do not reflect risk. Rapid early-career
earnings growth does not, by this view, contribute to earnings volatility. The
smooth portion of this earnings growth is expected; if an earnings-experience
profile were completely smooth, by this concept it would have zero earnings
volatility.
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The life cycle earnings profiles that I estimate include worker fixed effects,
worker-specific trends, and a quartic in potential experience. The coefficients
on the potential experience terms are allowed to differ by education group
(high school or less, some college, and college or more), and coefficients esti-
mated at the education-group level are allowed to change smoothly over time
in a cubic path. Denote log real earnings by y and potential experience by x.
For worker i in education group s in year t, the profile is
yist = γi + δixist +
3
∑
k=1
β1kstkxist +
4
∑
j=2
3
∑
k=0
β jkstkx
j
ist + εist. (2.1)
This is a very flexible life cycle earnings profile that is a continuous function of
potential experience for each worker.
Denote the residuals from this profile by eit. My measure of a worker’s earn-
ings volatility at time t is the worker’s variance of these residuals during the
nine-year interval centered at t, [t− 4, t+ 4]. Conditional on estimated resid-
uals, this is the measure termed window averaging by Moffitt and Gottschalk
(2012). Because window averaging can be thought of as a class of measures
that potentially applies to any interval containing two or more observations, I
denote this nine-year version by WA9. I have biannual, not annual, earnings
observations—see chapter 3 for an explanation—so there are five observations
during the nine-year window. Therefore, my expression for earnings volatility
is
VWA9it =
1
4 ∑
τ∈[t−4,t+4]
(eiτ − eit)2, (2.2)
where eit is the worker’s mean residual over the window [t− 4, t+ 4].
Throughout this dissertation, economy-wide earnings volatility by my pre-
ferred measure refers to the cross-worker mean of earnings volatility for a given
11
year:
VWA9t =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
VWA9it . (2.3)
2.2 Concepts and measures of earnings volatility
A growing literature studies the magnitude of earnings changes and earn-
ings variability among men, women, and households, and especially whether
economy-wide measures of this magnitude have increased over time. How-
ever, the methods in these studies are generally not derived from a clearly
stated concept of earnings volatility. The result is a proliferation of measures
that sometimes reach different conclusions about the trend in economy-wide
earnings volatility, while implicitly treating earnings volatility as a single con-
cept.
Even the name of the phenomenon being studied is not settled. Most of
the literature refers to earnings volatility. The term earnings instability is less
frequently used, although it was coined by the most prominent researchers on
this topic (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994), and occasionally earnings variability
has been used. Because these are ordinarily synonymous terms, and because
there is no way to partition the literature into earnings volatility studies and
earnings instability studies, for clarity I adopt the term earnings volatility con-
sistently throughout this dissertation, even when discussing literature that has
used other terms.
Conceptually, earnings volatility is variability over time in a worker’s earn-
ings or in some component of those earnings. This section reviews several
concepts and measures of earnings volatility, following the diagram in Figure
2.1. I first separate the types of volatility by the earnings component for which
variability is measured: total earnings, earnings residuals from a life cycle earn-
12
ings profile, or transitory earnings, which are a subset of residual earnings. I
will begin with volatility of residual earnings because it is the most frequently
studied type of earnings volatility.
For measures of the volatility of residual earnings, the specification of the
life cycle profile is an important part of the measurement process, but is logi-
cally separate from the functions that measure earnings volatility once earnings
residuals have been estimated. That is, each combination of a specification for
life cycle earnings profiles and an earnings volatility measure that operates on
residuals from the profiles is a valid method for quantifying the volatility of
residual earnings. This section discusses the measurement of earnings volatil-
ity conditional on estimated earnings residuals (if applicable), and explains
why measures may differ even for a common sample of earnings or earnings
residuals. The next section discusses in detail the specification of the life cycle
profiles.
Some of the earnings volatility measures apply to individual workers, in
which cases a natural economy-wide measure is the mean of the worker-
specific measures for a given time period. Others apply to groups of work-
ers and are not additively decomposable into worker-specific measures. For
measures of the volatility of transitory earnings, this is a consequence of the
fact that the permanent and transitory components of residual earnings cannot
be separately identified for individuals. For measures of the volatility of total
earnings or residual earnings, authors using non-decomposable measures are
not interested in obtaining worker-specific earnings volatility, perhaps because
they are only interested in economy-wide earnings volatility or because they
want to compare earnings volatility across groups but do not need to do further
conditional analysis, such as regressing earnings volatility on worker-specific
13
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covariates. In these cases, as I detail below, the measures can always be viewed
as a function of worker-level measures and an average earnings change.
For notation, let real earnings for worker i in year t be Yit, and denote log
real earnings by yit. A life cycle earnings profile may be estimated using the
log earnings observations, and residuals from the profile are denoted eit. In
studies of the volatility of transitory earnings, it is typical to assume that these
residuals are additively separable into a permanent component, µit, which may
be multiplied by a time-varying factor loading, and a transitory component, νit.
First differences are denoted by ∆.
2.2.1 Volatility of residual earnings
Conceptually, volatility of residual earnings is variability over time in a worker’s
earnings that is not attributable to life cycle dynamics. Measures of the volatil-
ity of residual earnings typically begin by estimating life cycle earnings pro-
files, then quantifying the variability over time of residuals from these profiles.
However, this process can be reversed: One of the measures discussed be-
low first estimates a life cycle profile of log earnings changes, then computes
volatility using the residuals from this regression.
Volatility of residual earnings reflects changes in both the permanent and
transitory components of residual earnings. I discuss measures of the volatility
of residual earnings categorized by whether they apply to earnings residuals
from a single time period, two time periods, or three or more time periods.
Volatility in one time period
Drewianka (2010) measures the volatility of a worker’s residual earnings as
the distance between log earnings and the estimated life cycle earnings profile,
15
which is the absolute value of residual earnings:
VDit = |eit| . (2.4)
The natural corresponding economy-wide measure is the mean of workers’
volatilities in a given year:
VDt =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
VDit . (2.5)
While it may seem odd to measure volatility using a single observation,
the measure can be interpreted as the unexpected component of earnings in
a given year. This interpretation relies on the validity of the estimated life
cycle earnings profile as a measure of the expected component of earnings,
so Drewianka (2010) estimates very flexible profiles with worker-specific in-
tercepts as well as worker-specific coefficients on experience and experience
squared. If a worker’s earnings always lie on the worker’s estimate life cycle
earnings profile, the worker will have zero earnings volatility by this measure
in each year.
Still, this method can produce undesirable results. Consider a worker who
has an earnings residual of −1 for ten years, followed by ten years with an
earnings residual of 1. Most would say this worker has little to no earnings
volatility at the beginning and end of the panel, and positive earnings volatility
near the time of the earnings change. But by VDit , earnings volatility is positive
in each year and does not change over time. Volatility measures based on
earnings changes, discussed immediately below, give more intuitive results.
Volatility over two time periods
The absolute residual change (AC) and squared residual change (SC) mea-
sures One natural measure of the volatility of a worker’s residual earnings is
16
the magnitude of the worker’s change in residual log earnings:
VACit = |∆eit| = |eit − ei,t−1| . (2.6)
Below, I argue that another natural measure, the square of the change in resid-
ual log earnings,
VSCit = (∆eit)
2 = (eit − ei,t−1)2 , (2.7)
is a more attractive measure when the motivation for studying earnings volatil-
ity is risk, in the sense that shocks in the labor market may pass through to
consumption volatility. For both measures, the natural corresponding mea-
sure of economy-wide volatility of residual earnings is the mean of workers’
volatilities:
VACt =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
VACit ; V
SC
t =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
VSCit . (2.8)
Given the simplicity and directness of these measures, it is surprising that
they have not previously been used by researchers studying volatility of resid-
ual earnings.
The Shin and Solon (SS) measure Shin and Solon (2011), Juhn and McCue
(2010), Celik et al. (2012), and Shin (2012) measure economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings as the standard deviation of residual log earnings changes
from one period to the next. They first compute changes in log earnings, then
estimate a life cycle profile of these changes, and measure volatility using resid-
uals from this profile. Denote the residuals by ∆˜eit and the mean of these resid-
uals in year t by ∆˜et. The SS measure of economy-wide volatility of residual
earnings is
VSSt = sd(∆˜eit) =
[
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(
∆˜eit − ∆˜et
)2] 12
. (2.9)
As Shin and Solon (2011) point out, this is an easily understood and easily
calculated measure, which is likely why others have adopted it in work that
17
describes the evolution of economy-wide earnings volatility over time in dif-
ferent data sets.
This measure can be expressed as a function of worker-specific residual
earnings changes and the average or aggregate residual earnings change:
VSSt =
[
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(
∆˜eit
)2 − N
N − 1
(
∆˜et
)2] 12
. (2.10)
Suppose that the SS approach to taking residuals—earnings changes first,
then life cycle profiles—roughly matches the more common approach of esti-
mating life cycle profiles on log earnings and using changes in the residuals
from those profiles. That is, suppose ∆eit ≈ ∆˜eit. Then it is easy to see from
(2.7) and (2.10) that the square of the SS measure is related to the mean of the
SC measure:
(VSSt )
2 ≈ VSCt −
(
∆et
)2
. (2.11)
In my view, the SS measure understates earnings volatility by missing the ag-
gregate earnings change, which is unlikely to be anticipated by workers. In
practice, researchers using the SS measure estimate the life cycle profile of earn-
ings changes separately by year, implicitly setting ∆˜et = 0. I further discuss
this issue conceptually in section 2.3 and empirically in section 4.3.
Volatility over three or more time periods
For measures of the volatility of residual earnings that apply to three or more
time periods, it is useful to distinguish between two subcategories. Measures
of the variability of earnings residuals, which are defined on levels of resid-
uals, are unaffected by any permutation of the earnings residuals for a given
worker; the order of the residuals does not matter. Measures of the magnitude
of changes in earnings residuals are potentially affected by permutations of
18
the worker’s earnings residuals; order matters. I will briefly discuss each type,
then characterize the relationship between them for a special case.
Note that for two-period measures of the volatility of residual earnings,
order does not matter, because the variability of two observations contains
the same information as the distance between the two observations. Another
way of seeing this is to note that each measure discussed in this chapter is
unchanged if the order of the residuals is exactly reversed. For two-period
measures, reversal is the only possible permutation of the observations.
Variability of earnings residuals—the window averaging (WA) measure In
the window averaging (WA) measure, the volatility of a worker’s residual earn-
ings in year t is the variance of the worker’s earnings residuals in some interval
that contains t. This measure was introduced by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994)
and later used by those authors in Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) and Mof-
fitt and Gottschalk (2012), as well as by DeBacker et al. (2013). Typically, the
earnings volatility in the window is assigned to the window midpoint, so that
volatility at time t applies to a window centered on t. Let p be the length
of the window and w = p−12 be the number of distinct time periods in the
window both before and after t. I will treat window averaging as a class of
measures, with the specific measure determined by the window length and
denoted WAp. Let the worker’s average earnings residual over the window
be eit. Then the volatility of the worker’s residual earnings by this measure,
assuming an earnings observation for each time period during the window, is
VWApit =
1
p− 1
t+w
∑
τ=t−w
(eiτ − eit)2, (2.12)
19
and the corresponding measure of economy-wide volatility of residual earn-
ings is the mean of the worker-specific measures:
VWApt =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
VWApit . (2.13)
Note that a temporal rearrangement of the residual earnings observations within
the window does not change the worker-level measure.
Typically, the chosen interval is a nine-year window centered at t, so the
resulting WA9 measure at the worker level is
VWA9it =
1
8
t+4
∑
τ=t−4
(eiτ − eit)2. (2.14)
However, in principle the method could be applied to as few as two observa-
tions, as I discuss below.
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) interpret the window averaging measure us-
ing an earnings dynamics model, taking the worker’s mean earnings residual
over the window as the worker’s permanent earnings for the window, and the
deviations from that mean as transitory components. Of course, the perma-
nent component of earnings may change over the window; for example, the
worker may change jobs. Because of this, the window averaging measure will
be driven by changes in both the permanent and transitory components of
earnings, which is why I classify it as a measure of the volatility of residual
earnings rather than of the volatility of transitory earnings.1
Magnitude of changes in residual earnings Volatility measures that are de-
fined in terms of changes in earnings residuals, and that apply to three or
1For example, consider an earnings series that takes on a given value before year t, then
a higher value beginning in year t. The window averaging measure applied to a window
centered at t will estimate that permanent earnings is between the two values, and will judge
the transitory component to have been negative before year t and positive beginning in year
t. Therefore, estimated earnings volatility will be positive even though this earnings series
contains a change in permanent earnings while the transitory component is always zero.
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more time periods, are potentially affected by permutation of a worker’s earn-
ings residuals. No such measures have been studied in the literature on earn-
ings volatility, but many combinations of two-period measures would have this
property. For example, consider the sum of two consecutive observations of a
worker’s squared change in residual log earnings, the SC measure introduced
above. This measure is defined on three observations of earnings residuals.
Denote the volatility as applying to the middle of these three time periods:
VΣSCit = V
SC
it +V
SC
i,t+1 = (eit − ei,t−1)2 + (ei,t+1 − eit)2 . (2.15)
Relationship between variability of residuals and magnitude of changes
This section provides one way of understanding how these two types of volatil-
ity of residual earnings are related. I use the special case of three time periods
and the window averaging method to show that, for a constant variance of the
worker’s earnings residuals over the three time periods, a measure of the mag-
nitude of changes is minimized when the two changes in residual earnings are
of exactly the same sign and magnitude, and maximized when the two changes
are of equal magnitude but opposite sign.
My measure of the variability of earnings residuals during the three time
periods is the window averaging measure: the variance of the residuals over
that interval. To remain consistent with the empirical portions of this disser-
tation, I treat the earnings observations as being two years apart, so that the
three time periods span five years. Therefore, I denote this measure WA5. Let
the three time periods be t− 2, t, and t+ 2, and let ei be the worker’s average
residual over those time periods. Then the WA5 measure is
VWA5i =
1
2
[
(ei,t−2 − ei)2 + (eit − ei)2 + (ei,t+2 − ei)2
]
. (2.16)
For my measure of the magnitude of earnings changes during those same
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three time periods, first note that the window averaging approach on two ob-
servations can be expressed in terms of the change in the earnings residuals.
Consider the window averaging approach applied to t− 2 and t, denoting the
measure WA3 because it spans three years. Then, by simplifying the definition
of the window averaging measure,
VWA3it =
(
ei,t−2 − ei,t−2 + eit2
)2
+
(
eit − ei,t−2 + eit2
)2
=
(eit − ei,t−2)2
2
.
(2.17)
Therefore, one measure of the magnitude of earnings changes over the three
time periods is the sum of VWA3it and V
WA3
i,t+2 , which I denote V
ΣWA3
i . By equation
(2.17), this measure is equivalent to
VΣWA3i =
1
2
[
(eit − ei,t−2)2 + (ei,t+2 − eit)2
]
. (2.18)
I will describe how volatility as measured by ΣWA3 may change as the vari-
ance of the worker’s earnings residuals over the three-period window, which
determines WA5, is held constant. As an illustration of the general result, con-
sider the case in which VWA5i = 3. The ΣWA3 measure is minimized when
the two changes in earnings residuals have the same sign and magnitude—in
this case, the residuals are
(−√3, 0,√3), and VΣWA3i = 32 . The ΣWA3 mea-
sure is maximized when the two changes are of equal magnitude but opposite
sign—here, the residuals are (−1, 2,−1), and volatility is three times as large,
at VΣWA3i =
9
2 . Again, these two residual vectors give the same amount of
volatility under the WA5 measure, even though in the latter vector, the signs of
the changes are different and both earnings changes are of larger magnitude
compared to the former vector.
For the general result, first note that neither the WA5 measure nor the
ΣWA3 measure is affected by adding the same amount to all three earnings
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residuals. (WA5 is defined in terms of deviations from the mean residual, and
WA3 can be expressed in terms of the change in earnings residuals.) With-
out loss of generality, I assume the mean earnings residual over the three time
periods is zero. It will be useful to denote the sum of the worker’s squared
earnings residuals by c. (The example above was constructed using c = 6.)
The WA5 measure simplifies to
VWA5i =
c
2
. (2.19)
Let di = (ei,t+2 − eit)− (eit − ei,t−2) denote the difference in the residual earn-
ings changes. This is a measure of the dissimilarity of the changes; it is zero if
the changes are of the same magnitude and sign. The ΣWA3 measure simpli-
fies to
VΣWA3i =
c
4
+
d2i
12
. (2.20)
Therefore, ΣWA3 is minimized when the two earnings changes are exactly
the same, so that di = 0. This occurs when eit = 0, |ei,t−2| = |ei,t+2| =
√ c
2 , and
ei,t−2 + ei,t+2 = 0.
It can be shown that, subject to the c remaining constant, ΣWA3 is maxi-
mized when |eit| =
√
2c
3 and ei,t−2 = ei,t+2 = − eit2 . In this case, the earnings
changes are of the same magnitude—the largest allowed by the constraint on
the sum of squared residuals—but of opposite sign. The dissimilarity index
attains its maximum value of d2i = 6c, and the ΣWA3 measure reaches
3c
4 . So,
while these extreme results give the same amount of volatility by the WA5
measure, one is three times as volatile as the other by the ΣWA3 measure.
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2.2.2 Volatility of total earnings
Volatility of total earnings is variability over time in a worker’s earnings or log
earnings. Types of volatility of total earnings follow the same categorization
detailed in Figure 2.1 for volatility of residual earnings. Rather than cover-
ing the same distinctions, this subsection briefly details the small literature on
volatility of total earnings. All of the measures apply to two time periods.
The Fields and Ok measures Fields and Ok (1996) develop axiomatically
a class of measures of non-directional mobility (see section 2.3 for a concep-
tual distinction between volatility and non-directional mobility). Their pre-
ferred measure of a worker’s non-directional mobility is the absolute value of
the worker’s earnings change, |Yit −Yi,t−1|. Fields and Ok (1999) recognize
that one may be concerned with proportional rather than absolute earnings
changes, and they axiomatically justify using the absolute value of the worker’s
change in log earnings, |yit − yi,t−1|, as a measure of non-directional mobility.
In both cases, economy-wide non-directional mobility is the mean of worker-
specific non-directional mobility in a given time period.
The arc percent change (APC) measure Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish (2011),
Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger (2011), and Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2012)
measure economy-wide volatility of total earnings as the standard deviation of
the arc percent change in earnings. Denote the worker’s average earnings level
in years t− 1 and t by Yit = Yi,t−1+Yit2 The arc percent change in earnings is
∆YAPCit =
100× ∆Yit
Yit
. (2.21)
As Ziliak, Hardy, and Bollinger (2011) point out, the arc percent change is
bounded below by −200 percent and above by 200 percent.
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Denote the mean arc percent earnings change in year t by ∆YAPCt . The arc
percent change measure of the economy-wide volatility of total earnings is
VAPCt = sd
(
∆YAPCit
)
=
[
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(
∆YAPCit − ∆Y
APC
t
)2] 12
. (2.22)
As with the SS measure above, the arc percent change measure can be ex-
pressed as a function of worker-specific earnings changes and an aggregate
earnings change:
VAPCt =
[
1
N − 1
N
∑
i=1
(
∆YAPCit
)2 − N
N − 1
(
∆YAPCt
)2] 12
. (2.23)
From this expression, it is easy to see that the APC measure arguably under-
states earnings volatility by excluding the aggregate shock, ∆YAPCt .
This measure is defined on levels of earnings rather than residual log earn-
ings. As a result, one virtue of the measure is that workers who have positive
earnings in at least one of the two years will have an earnings volatility obser-
vation, whereas measures that work with log earnings restrict the sample to
workers with positive earnings in both periods.
2.2.3 Volatility of transitory earnings
Volatility of transitory earnings describes variability in earnings residuals that
is due to a transitory component of earnings, rather than a permanent compo-
nent. Permanent and transitory shocks cannot be distinguished at the worker-
year level, so there are no worker-year-level measures of the volatility of tran-
sitory earnings. Instead, long panel data on workers is used to estimate the
parameters of earnings dynamics models. One such parameter, the variance of
the transitory earnings shock, is typically taken as the measure of the volatility
of transitory earnings, and is often allowed to vary over time. This volatility is
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best interpreted as a summary measure of the possibly heterogeneous volatil-
ity faced by individual workers; many studies compute volatility of transitory
earnings both on the full sample and on various subgroups. In this subsec-
tion I briefly discuss the primary method of measuring volatility of transitory
earnings.
Estimating parametric earnings models Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) sepa-
rate earnings residuals into a permanent component, µit, with a time-varying
factor loading, αt, and a transitory component, νit. The permanent component
is allowed to follow a random walk with innovations, ωit, and a worker-specific
drift, δi. The transitory component is modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process with
autoregressive parameter ρ and moving average parameter θ. Transitory shocks
are denoted by ξit and have a year-specific loading βt, so that the combined
shock, βtξit, has year-specific variance β2t Var(ξit). The earnings process is:
eit = αtµit + νit;
µit = µi,t−1 + δi +ωit;
νit = ρνi,t−1 + βtξit + θβt−1ξi,t−1.
(2.24)
See Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) for a full statement of the model, includ-
ing the specification of the covariances among shocks. The parameters of the
model are estimated by minimizing the distance between the empirical and
model-implied autocovariance matrices. The change over time in the volatil-
ity of transitory earnings can be seen in the evolution of the estimated βt.
Similar approaches, with some differences in the specification of the shock
processes, have been adopted by Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995, 2002), Haider
(2001), Stevens (2001), Baker and Solon (2003), and DeBacker et al. (2013).
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2.3 Motivation and measurement of earnings volatility
As I discussed in the introduction, the study of earnings volatility is primar-
ily motivated by the consequences of labor market risk. This section briefly
explores four ways to better tie the measurement of earnings volatility to this
primary motivation. First, volatility of residual earnings is conceptually more
attractive than volatility of total earnings or volatility of transitory earnings.
Second, life cycle earnings profiles should not absorb aggregate shocks, which
are unlikely to be anticipated by workers. Third, life cycle earnings profiles
should include worker-specific earnings trends, because research on consump-
tion behavior suggests workers anticipate these trends. Finally, the risk motiva-
tion for studying earnings volatility suggests a particular welfare loss of inter-
est. If one is willing to impose some structure on workers’ utility functions, this
insight can guide the choice of functional form in a earnings volatility measure.
The empirical importance of each issue is discussed in chapter 4.
2.3.1 Volatility of residual earnings and total earnings
Of the three types of earnings volatility outlined above, volatility of residual
earnings is the most appropriate when risk is the motivation for the research.
Volatility of total earnings includes earnings variability due to life cycle dy-
namics, which is not interesting from a risk perspective. Volatility of transitory
earnings attempts to isolate earnings variability due to transitory shocks rather
than permanent shocks, but permanent shocks are much more important than
transitory shocks when the concern is consumption volatility (Blundell, Pista-
ferri, and Preston, 2008).
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2.3.2 Aggregate shocks
Should the parameters of the life cycle profile change over time? I argue that
they should, but only as a continuous function of time. Time-invariant pa-
rameters are implausible. Suppose, for example, that the return to education
increases, as it has in the U.S. (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Eventually, the
new return will be incorporated into workers’ expectations about the life cy-
cle profiles. However, time-specific parameters are also unattractive, because
year-to-year variation in the estimates will absorb aggregate shocks, which are
unlikely to to be anticipated by workers, as part of the life cycle profile be-
fore earnings volatility is measured. Time-specific parameters also increase the
sampling error of each estimate, creating unnecessary noise in measures of
volatility.
All previous studies of the volatility of residual earnings or transitory earn-
ings that are cited in this chapter use year-specific coefficients in the life cycle
earnings profiles, so aggregate shocks that look like volatility to the worker
may be missed in the volatility measurement. My preferred life cycle profile,
equation (2.1), allows the parameters of the life cycle profile to change over
time, but constrains the changes to follow a smooth path.
2.3.3 Heterogeneous earnings trends
Another issue is how to handle the fact that earnings grow at different rates
among observationally equivalent workers. Within a cohort, the cross-sectional
variance of earnings increases with experience (Deaton and Paxson, 1994; Gu-
venen, 2009; DeBacker et al., 2013). The key question in the context of earnings
volatility is whether this “fanning out” is a symptom of labor market risk. Are
heterogeneous trends the result of a series of unanticipated shocks—for exam-
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ple, from a permanent earnings process that contains a random walk or an
AR(1) process with high persistence (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989;
Hryshko, 2012)? Or do workers have good information on their own growth
rate and therefore anticipate the resulting earnings changes?
Guvenen and Smith (2010) use consumption data to show that workers
mostly anticipate earnings changes resulting from heterogeneous trends. If
this is true, and worker-specific trends are not included in the life cycle earn-
ings profiles, then workers with better- and worse-than-average trends will
have persistently higher earnings volatility compared to a worker with an av-
erage trend. This could be empirically meaningful: Guvenen (2009) finds that
worker-specific trends account for about one third of intracohort inequality at
10 years of potential experience and about two thirds at 30 years of potential
experience.
My preferred life cycle profile, equation (2.1), includes heterogeneous trends.
Most studies of the volatility of residual or transitory earnings that are cited in
this chapter do not include these trends. Exceptions include Drewianka (2010),
who includes worker-specific quadratics, and the earnings dynamics model in
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012).
2.3.4 Functional form choice
Different measures of earnings volatility may lead to different conclusions
about whether economy-wide earnings volatility rose or fell from one time pe-
riod to the next, and about the extent to which earnings volatility has changed
over a longer time period, as I show in chapter 4. I have already highlighted
two reasons that measures of earnings volatility may differ: they may quan-
tify different concepts of earnings volatility, and they may begin with different
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earnings residuals as the result of different life cycle profile specifications. This
subsection addresses a third reason that measures may differ, even for two
measures of the same type of earnings volatility and using the same earnings
residuals: the functional form of the measure.
The risk motivation for studying earnings volatility implies a natural wel-
fare loss of interest: the loss in utility caused by not being able to smooth con-
sumption as a result of the earnings shocks. This is the difference between util-
ity without liquidity constraints and realized utility. If one is willing to make
some assumptions about workers’ utility functions, some earnings volatility
measures become more attractive than others.
Consider a very basic two-period example. For simplicity, assume no dis-
counting and zero interest rates, and to abstract from the issue of consumption
and savings behavior in response to steady life cycle growth in earnings, as-
sume the worker is on a flat portion of his life cycle earnings profile, so that it
does not matter whether one works with the level of earnings or the deviation
of earnings from a life cycle profile.
Suppose the worker receives earnings I − v in the first period and I + v
in the second period, for some v ∈ [0, I]. Denote utility as a function of con-
sumption in each period by u(c), and total utility in the two periods by U(c).
Without liquidity constraints, the worker would consume I in each period for
total utility U(c?) = 2u(I). Suppose that with liquidity constraints, the worker
can smooth all but a fraction κ ∈ [0, 1] of the shock, so that total utility is
U(c′) = u(I − κv) + u(I + κv). Of interest is the welfare loss U(c?)−U(c′).
Clearly, the functional form of the welfare loss depends on the worker’s
utility function. However, the loss can be approximated in the area of v = 0
using a Taylor series. With a second-order Taylor series approximation, the
30
welfare loss depends on the square of v but not separately on v itself for many
commonly used utility functions. For constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility with risk aversion parameter θ ≥ 0, the approximation to the welfare
loss is κθv
2
Iθ+1 ; for the log utility case (θ = 1) this simplifies to
κv2
I2 .
The form of this welfare loss suggests that it is earnings shocks relative
to smoothed earnings that matter, rather than the magnitudes of the shocks
themselves, and that it is the squares of these normalized shocks that are of
interest. So, an attractive two-period earnings volatility measure will use the
square of changes in log earnings or residual log earnings.
Consider two measures: the two-period window averaging approach that
takes the variance of the two earnings residuals, or an alternative measure that
uses the standard deviation of those same residuals. The same approximation
approach reveals that in the neighborhood of v = 0, the standard deviation
approach follows
√
2v
I , while the variance approach follows
2v2
I2 . Also, it is
straightforward to show that the absolute change in log earnings or residual log
earnings follows 2vI , while the squared change in log earnings or residual log
earnings follows 4v
2
I2 . This means that when risk is the motivation for studying
earnings volatility, measures such as WA and SC are preferable to the square
root of WA and to AC, SS, or APC (recall that the last two are defined by cross-
worker standard deviations rather than variances, so the units are log dollars
instead of squared log dollars).2
This exercise illustrates why the most attractive measures of earnings volatil-
ity may be different from preferred measures of other concepts of earnings
changes, such as some types of earnings mobility. Measures of the volatility
of residual earnings should be chosen while keeping in mind the welfare loss
2Classical or mean-reverting measurement error will cause measured earnings volatility to
overstate true earnings volatility, but will not affect these arguments about which volatility
measures are proportional to the welfare loss.
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caused by the earnings volatility: the difference between utility without liq-
uidity constraints and realized utility. But measures of earnings mobility, for
example, may be chosen while keeping in mind the welfare change from one
period to another; Fields and Ok (1999) have shown that absolute changes in
log earnings have attractive properties in the case of non-directional mobility.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
This chapter details the data sources used in this dissertation. All of the
descriptive results in chapter 4, on the change over time in economy-wide
earnings volatility and on how earnings volatility differs across, are from the
PSID. The final chapter accounts for the rise in economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity among the PSID sample, and uses data from the CPS to measure labor
demand shocks.
3.1 PSID
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics covering interview years
1970–2009.1 The labor earnings measure is wage and salary earnings, which
is the most consistently measured labor earnings series in the PSID. Therefore,
earnings sources such as self-employment income and bonuses are excluded.
I include in the earnings sample all worker-years for men in the PSID cross
section sample (that is, excluding the Survey of Economic Opportunity sample;
see Shin and Solon (2011), footnote 11) who, in the earnings reference year, are
heads of household, are age 25 to 59, are not students, are not self-employed
in their main job, and have positive earnings and at least 500 hours worked. I
drop observations in the top or bottom one percent of earnings in each year,
which is designed to get rid of severe outliers and lessen the effect of earnings
top-codes.
Following the recommendation of Brown and Light (1992), I clean the job
tenure series by assigning a new job if and only if reported tenure is less than
the time since the previous interview, then adjusting the following tenure ob-
1Interview year 2009 was the latest year available when I began the empirical portion of this
dissertation.
33
servations within a job to be consistent with this first report. PSID sample
weights are used throughout.
After annual interviews during 1968–1997, the PSID began biannual in-
terviews in 1999. This is unfortunate for my purposes because biannual in-
terviews yield only five observations over a nine-year window. This smaller
sample size could make earnings volatility measurements noisier after 1997
compared to before 1997. To exclude this possibility, I drop all even-numbered
interview years before calculating earnings volatility and performing any of
the analysis. That is, I keep biannual interviews for 1971–2009.
This yields an earnings sample of 23,306 worker-year observations over 20
interview years, from 3,506 unique workers. I use this sample to estimate the
life cycle earnings profiles specified in section 2.1. Finally, I calculate earnings
volatility, which requires earnings data for each of the five interview years in
the nine-year period.2 The earnings volatility is assigned to the midpoint of this
window, so that I have earnings volatility measures every two years beginning
in 1975 (using the interval 1971–1979) and ending in 2005 (using the interval
2001–2009). In all there are 9,479 volatility observations, which come from 1,816
workers.
Descriptive statistics are in Table 3.1. Note that labor demand shocks are
identified using CPS data, discussed below.
2As I discuss further below, trends in economy-wide earnings volatility over time are similar
if the standard for calculating volatility is relaxed to having at least four or at least three
observations during the window.
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Table 3.1: Variable means by subgroup and time period
1975–2005 1975–1981 1983–1989 1991–1997 1999–2005
Job change
No job change 0.529 0.486 0.537 0.577 0.510
Voluntary job change 0.323 0.336 0.289 0.290 0.367
Involuntary job change 0.148 0.178 0.174 0.133 0.123
Demand shock index
Low shock index 0.500 0.847 0.487 0.254 0.501
High shock index 0.500 0.153 0.513 0.746 0.499
Education
High school or less 0.396 0.493 0.393 0.360 0.368
Some college 0.254 0.212 0.252 0.260 0.276
College or more 0.350 0.296 0.355 0.380 0.356
Experience
6–15 years 0.292 0.336 0.371 0.261 0.234
16–25 years 0.395 0.294 0.400 0.480 0.382
26–39 years 0.313 0.369 0.229 0.258 0.384
Unemployment rate
Below 6 percent 0.525 0.235 0.191 0.561 0.915
At or above 6 percent 0.475 0.765 0.809 0.439 0.085
Married
Not married 0.179 0.089 0.157 0.200 0.234
Married 0.821 0.911 0.843 0.800 0.766
Union membership
Non-union 0.790 0.737 0.750 0.795 0.847
Union 0.210 0.263 0.250 0.205 0.153
Occupation
Managers 0.206 0.186 0.213 0.237 0.188
Professionals 0.173 0.145 0.166 0.179 0.191
Technicians 0.047 0.043 0.048 0.052 0.045
Sales 0.043 0.040 0.035 0.036 0.057
Office and admin. 0.066 0.067 0.071 0.060 0.068
Prod./craft/repair 0.229 0.268 0.249 0.217 0.199
Operators/laborers 0.180 0.209 0.171 0.160 0.185
Services 0.055 0.042 0.046 0.059 0.066
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Table 3.1: Variable means by subgroup and time period (continued)
1975–2005 1975–1981 1983–1989 1991–1997 1999–2005
Industry
Ag./extr./constr. 0.028 0.027 0.029 0.027 0.028
Manufacturing 0.076 0.071 0.071 0.074 0.085
Trans./comm./util. 0.329 0.415 0.344 0.304 0.286
Wholesale/retail 0.115 0.109 0.127 0.119 0.106
FIRE/prof. svc. 0.139 0.126 0.127 0.145 0.150
Public administration 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.037
Employer tenure
0–5 years 0.420 0.439 0.479 0.373 0.404
5–10 years 0.251 0.254 0.279 0.266 0.215
>10 years 0.330 0.307 0.242 0.361 0.381
Occupation tenure
0–5 years 0.252 0.301 0.267 0.218 0.239
5–10 years 0.282 0.316 0.323 0.275 0.237
>10 years 0.466 0.383 0.410 0.507 0.524
Industry tenure
0–5 years 0.248 0.278 0.251 0.232 0.241
5–10 years 0.279 0.323 0.306 0.267 0.244
>10 years 0.473 0.400 0.443 0.501 0.515
Observations 9479 2324 2372 2334 2449
Notes: Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see text for details. Variables are
defined for nine-year intervals. See Table 5.1 for details. The intervals are denoted by their
midpoint, so the first window is centered at 1975 (using data for 1971–1979) and the final
window is centered at 2005 (using data for 2005–2009).
3.2 CPS
I use March Current Population Survey IPUMS data for workers age 16–64 in
years 1971–2009 (King et al., 2010). The CPS data is used to measure the initial
distribution of occupation-industry sectors within demographic groups, and to
measure the subsequent labor demand shocks for occupation-industry sectors.
The initial distribution and subsequent shocks are based on hours worked.
Prior to 1976, weeks worked in the previous year was an interval variable, and
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hours worked referred to the previous week. I multiply the interval midpoint
by hours in the previous week to estimate hours worked during the previ-
ous year. Beginning in 1976, I calculate hours worked in the previous year by
multiplying weeks worked in the previous year by the usual number of hours
worked. I use the harmonized occupation (OCC1990) and industry (IND1950)
variables available in IPUMS to classify workers into occupation-industry sec-
tors.
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CHAPTER 4
EARNINGS VOLATILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
This chapter presents empirical evidence on earnings volatility in the U.S.
Section 4.1 looks at economy-wide earnings volatility and its components over
time, section 4.2 is about which workers have higher earnings volatility and
which workers have experienced larger increases in earnings volatility, and
section 4.3 assesses the empirical importance of the methodological recom-
mendations I made in chapter 2.
4.1 Economy-wide earnings volatility over time
In this section, I show that economy-wide volatility of residual earnings in-
creased by my preferred measure among men in the U.S. between 1975 and
2005. I show that this finding is robust to changing the length of the window
over which workers’ earnings volatility is computed, to including workers who
do not have earnings observations for each time period in the window, and
to dropping earnings volatility observations based on any imputed values of
earnings. Finally, I show that about 70 percent of the increase in economy-wide
earnings volatility can be explained by rising volatility of hourly wages, with
the rest explained by higher volatility of hours worked.
4.1.1 Has earnings volatility increased?
Figure 4.1 displays the trend in economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
among male heads of household in the U.S. from 1975 to 2005. The upward
trend is clear and there are sustained increases from 1975–1987 and 1993–2001.
Although the rate of increase has declined over time, economy-wide earnings
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Figure 4.1: Economy-wide volatility of residual earnings by year
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of
workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see
chapter 3 for details.
volatility was higher in each year during 1997–2005 than at any time in the
sample before 1997.1
Earlier studies found that economy-wide earnings volatility for U.S. males
has increased since the 1970s, with little evidence of an increase after the mid-
1980s (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994; Haider, 2001; Stevens, 2001; Moffitt and
Gottschalk, 2002). Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) do find an uptick in the late
1990s before their sample ends in 2000; the trend in Figure 4.1 confirms this.
1To the extent that some unexplained earnings variation is due to measurement error, the
proportional change in “true” earnings volatility was even larger.
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4.1.2 Robustness of earnings volatility trend
The earnings volatility measurement process described in chapter 2 involves
some arbitrary decisions, so it is useful to check whether these choices affect
the finding that economy-wide volatility of residual earnings increased signif-
icantly over the sample period.
The decision to use a nine-year window for computing earnings volatility
attempts to balance the need for a good estimate of the variance of residual
earnings with the fact that the variance itself may change over time. Figure 4.2
shows that the trend in economy-wide volatility of residual earnings is affected
very little by changing the volatility window to five or 13 years.
In computing earnings volatility over a nine-year period, I have required
that all five possible earnings observations within the window are available.
This disproportionately excludes workers who experience a long spell of non-
employment, as well as workers who are more likely to leave the sample for a
variety of reasons. Figure 4.3 shows that when the requirement for an earnings
volatility observation is relaxed to at least three or at least four earnings obser-
vations within the nine-year window, the increase in economy-wide earnings
volatility over the sample period is at least as large.
A final concern is that the trend in economy-wide earnings volatility has
been influenced by changes in the way that PSID imputes missing or unreli-
able earnings observations, or by a change in the incidence of such observa-
tions. The fraction of earnings observations that were imputed rose from about
1 percent in the early 1970s to about 3 percent in the late 2000s, and the frac-
tion of nine-year volatility windows in which at least one of the five earnings
observations was imputed rose from about 3 percent to about 8 percent over
the sample period. Figure 4.4 shows that the trend in economy-wide earnings
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Figure 4.2: Economy-wide volatility of residual earnings by year for various
window widths
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of the
worker’s earnings residuals during a window of the specified width centered on that
year. The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile, specified
in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of workers’
volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see chapter 3
for details. Earnings observations are every other year for reasons discussed in chapter
3.
volatility changes very little when imputed earnings observations are dropped.
4.1.3 Components of earnings volatility
Before analyzing the contributions of various mechanisms to the trend shown
in Figure 4.1, it is useful to understand whether rising volatility of residual
earnings is being driven by increases in the volatility of hourly wages, volatility
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Figure 4.3: Economy-wide volatility of residual earnings by year for various
minimum observation requirements
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of
workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see
chapter 3 for details. Earnings observations are every other year for reasons discussed
in chapter 3.
of hours worked, or both. The answer is helpful for forming hypotheses about
mechanisms and also serves as a rough check on the detailed results discussed
in chapter 5. If volatility of wages alone explains the rise in economy-wide
earnings volatility, for example, that suggests that business cycle amplitudes
are not a major explanation, and that wage-related explanations should domi-
nate in the empirical results.
Some previous research has considered the separate contributions of volatil-
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Figure 4.4: Economy-wide volatility of residual earnings by year for full and
non-imputed samples
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of
workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see
chapter 3 for details. The proportion of volatility observations that depend on at least
one imputed earnings value rises from about 3 percent at the beginning of the sample
to about 8 percent at the end of the sample.
ity of wages and hours to earnings volatility. Comparing nine-year windows
centered at 1974 and 1983, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) computed volatil-
ity of both weekly wages and weeks worked, finding that volatility of wages
explained about 60 percent of the rise in economy-wide earnings volatility.
Haider (2001) found that volatility of wages and hours contributed roughly
equally to the rise in economy-wide earnings volatility.
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Because log earnings are the sum of log wages and log hours, the variance
of a worker’s log earnings over a given window is easily decomposed into three
variance components: the variance of log wages, the variance of log hours, and
a wages-hours covariance term. For worker i, let y be log real earnings, w be
log real wages, and h be log hours. Using an excessive amount of notation
to emphasize that the variances are worker-specific and apply to a window
centered at time t, the decomposition is
Varit(yi,t−4, . . . , yi,t+4) = Varit(wi,t−4, . . . ,wi,t+4) +Varit(hi,t−4, . . . , hi,t+4)
+ 2Covit
(
(wi,t−4, . . . ,wi,t+4), (hi,t−4, . . . , hi,t+4)
)
.
(4.1)
This decomposition can be approximated by expressing the volatility of
residual earnings as the sum of the volatilities of residual wages and residual
hours, plus a covariance term. Volatilities of residual wages and residual hours
are calculated by replacing the left hand side of the life cycle earnings profile,
equation (2.1), with log real wages and log annual hours, respectively, then
applying the same window averaging measure, equation (2.2), to the residuals.
The resulting empirical decomposition is not equivalent to the variance
expression above because volatility is calculated not from raw observations,
which appear in (4.1), but from residuals after removing life cycle effects. De-
note volatility of residual earnings, residual wages, and residual hours for
worker i in year t by Vyit , V
w
it , and V
h
it , respectively. Then the decomposition
to be implemented is
Vyit = V
w
it +V
h
it + νit, (4.2)
where ν represents a forcing term that captures in part the covariance term in
equation (4.1) and in part the fact that the variances in equation (4.1) do not
exactly correspond to the volatility terms in equation (4.2), as just explained.
Taking averages across workers, economy-wide volatility of residual earn-
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Table 4.1: Contributions of components to change in economy-wide volatility
of residual earnings
Percent
1975 level 2005 level Change contribution
Residual earnings 0.0374 0.0646 0.0272
Residual wages 0.0375 0.0571 0.0196 72.2
Residual hours 0.0271 0.0362 0.0091 33.6
Wages-hours covariance −0.0272 −0.0287 −0.0016 −5.8
Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of the worker’s
earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see equation (2.2). The
earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile, specified in equation (2.1).
Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year.
Volatility of residual wages and volatility of residual hours are calculated using the same
method applied to log real wages and log hours, respectively, instead of log real earnings.
Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details. Percent contribution
is the ratio of the change in the component to the change in volatility of residual earnings.
ings in year t can be decomposed as
Vyt = V
w
t +V
h
t + νt, (4.3)
where each term is the cross-worker mean for the specified year.
Figure 4.5 shows the trends of each component of equation (4.3). For most
of the sample period, the residual hours and covariance terms are roughly
constant, while the volatilities of residual earnings and residual wages rise at
similar rates. Table 4.1 shows the precise contribution of each term to explain-
ing the rise of economy-wide volatility of residual earnings between 1975 and
2005. The increase in economy-wide volatility of residual wages explains more
than 70 percent of the increase in economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
over this time. Increasing economy-wide volatility of residual hours worked
contributes about one third, and the covariance term plays very little role.
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Figure 4.5: Components of economy-wide volatility of residual earnings by
year
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility in a given year is the mean of
workers’ volatility in that year. Volatility of residual wages and volatility of residual
hours are calculated using the same method applied to log real wages and log hours,
respectively, instead of log real earnings. Sample is male heads of household in the
PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
4.2 Levels and trends of earnings volatility across workers
Table 4.2 shows mean volatility of residual earnings by subgroup and for five
time periods: the full sample period and four sub-periods. The first column
of results compares volatility of residual earnings, by my preferred measure,
across workers for many different sample partitions. For the full sample pe-
riod, there are significant differences in earnings volatility by earnings quintile,
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by occupation, and for many other cross-worker comparisons. I focus on some
of these results in detail later in this section. These findings are also interest-
ing as a starting point for considering why economy-wide earnings volatility
increased over time, which is discussed further in chapter 5, and I also present
these comparisons to set up the methodological exercises in section 4.3 below.
Table 4.2: Mean volatility of residual earnings by subgroup and time period
p-value of test
Change of increase
1975–2005 1975–1981 1983–1989 1991–1997 1999–2005 over time over time
All workers 0.057 0.040 0.057 0.059 0.065 0.025 0.000
Earnings quintile
Quintile 1 0.102 0.073 0.116 0.108 0.101 0.028 0.002
Quintile 2 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.070 0.071 0.016 0.006
Quintile 3 0.053 0.040 0.053 0.060 0.056 0.016 0.005
Quintile 4 0.048 0.028 0.036 0.054 0.067 0.039 0.000
Quintile 5 0.038 0.022 0.035 0.032 0.050 0.028 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Job change
No job change 0.035 0.023 0.032 0.036 0.043 0.021 0.000
Voluntary job change 0.075 0.041 0.073 0.089 0.085 0.044 0.000
Involuntary job change 0.097 0.086 0.109 0.096 0.096 0.010 0.146
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Demand shock index
Low shock index 0.052 0.041 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.017 0.000
High shock index 0.062 0.038 0.057 0.061 0.073 0.035 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.614 0.908 0.405 0.003
Education
High school or less 0.054 0.041 0.057 0.061 0.057 0.016 0.000
Some college 0.059 0.051 0.057 0.054 0.067 0.016 0.008
College or more 0.059 0.031 0.057 0.061 0.072 0.041 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.115 0.000 0.988 0.396 0.027
Experience
6–15 years 0.064 0.049 0.062 0.061 0.082 0.033 0.000
16–25 years 0.053 0.037 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.021 0.000
26–39 years 0.055 0.035 0.057 0.064 0.062 0.027 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.001 0.254 0.457 0.000
Unemployment rate
Below 6 percent 0.060 0.043 0.051 0.057 0.066 0.023 0.000
At or above 6 percent 0.053 0.040 0.059 0.062 0.057 0.017 0.004
p-value of equal means test 0.007 0.394 0.134 0.311 0.201
Married
Not married 0.077 0.050 0.081 0.072 0.085 0.035 0.000
Married 0.053 0.039 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.020 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.016 0.000
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Table 4.2: Mean volatility of residual earnings by subgroup and time period
(continued)
p-value of test
Change of increase
1975–2005 1975–1981 1983–1989 1991–1997 1999–2005 over time over time
Union membership
Non-union 0.058 0.036 0.060 0.061 0.065 0.029 0.000
Union 0.054 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.067 0.015 0.098
p-value of equal means test 0.360 0.000 0.003 0.247 0.835
Occupation
Managers 0.054 0.033 0.060 0.061 0.054 0.021 0.000
Professionals 0.052 0.021 0.026 0.051 0.083 0.062 0.000
Technicians 0.047 0.031 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.019 0.034
Sales 0.084 0.055 0.130 0.080 0.078 0.023 0.052
Office and admin. 0.060 0.040 0.057 0.068 0.067 0.028 0.019
Prod./craft/repair 0.056 0.046 0.064 0.053 0.060 0.014 0.005
Operators/laborers 0.061 0.055 0.061 0.066 0.062 0.008 0.104
Services 0.061 0.029 0.057 0.073 0.066 0.037 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.227 0.067
Industry
Ag./extr./constr. 0.062 0.031 0.053 0.069 0.083 0.052 0.008
Manufacturing 0.068 0.061 0.073 0.068 0.068 0.007 0.268
Trans./comm./util. 0.055 0.042 0.061 0.058 0.060 0.018 0.000
Wholesale/retail 0.051 0.039 0.046 0.049 0.064 0.025 0.002
FIRE/prof. svc. 0.069 0.049 0.070 0.079 0.071 0.022 0.001
Public administration 0.062 0.023 0.068 0.054 0.083 0.060 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employer tenure
0–5 years 0.072 0.052 0.070 0.078 0.082 0.030 0.000
5–10 years 0.049 0.034 0.049 0.045 0.065 0.032 0.000
>10 years 0.044 0.029 0.041 0.051 0.047 0.018 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Occupation tenure
0–5 years 0.075 0.055 0.072 0.087 0.084 0.030 0.000
5–10 years 0.054 0.040 0.055 0.048 0.073 0.033 0.000
>10 years 0.049 0.029 0.049 0.054 0.053 0.024 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industry tenure
0–5 years 0.073 0.054 0.076 0.077 0.081 0.027 0.000
5–10 years 0.055 0.041 0.052 0.048 0.074 0.033 0.000
>10 years 0.050 0.030 0.050 0.057 0.054 0.024 0.000
p-value of equal means test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 9479 2324 2372 2334 2449
Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on
that year; see equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile, specified in equation (2.1). Sample is male heads of
household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details. Column labeled Change over time gives change in mean volatility among the specified group from 1975–1981
to 1999–2005. Column labeled p-value of test of increase over time gives p-values from t tests in which the alternative hypothesis is that mean volatility for the
specified group was higher in 1999–2005 than in 1975–1981. Rows labeled p-value of equal means test give p-values from F tests of equality of means among
subcategories.
For almost all subgroups, mean volatility rises in each successive sub-period.
Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) also found a broad increase in earnings volatil-
ity using a smaller number of subgroups. The rightmost column of Table 4.2
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shows the p-value of a t test in which the alternative hypothesis is that earnings
volatility was higher in the final sub-period, 1999–2005, than in the first sub-
period, 1975–1981. No subgroup experienced a decrease in earnings volatility,
and the vast majority of the increases are significant at the 1 percent level. This
shows that the increase in volatility of residual earnings is a very broad phe-
nomenon, and is unlikely to be explained by simple compositional effects such
as changes in the distribution of education or occupation.
Before reviewing the results in depth, note that comparisons of earnings
volatility across workers are less reliable than comparisons across time. The
reason is that measurement error in earnings contributes to observed earnings
volatility, and the type or degree of measurement error differs across work-
ers (Duncan and Hill, 1985; Bound et al., 1994; Pischke, 1995), which compli-
cates cross-worker comparisons of earnings volatility. Comparisons of earnings
volatility over time within a defined population are not affected by heteroge-
neous measurement error, but would be affected by changes in measurement
error over time.
In this section I look closely at earnings volatility across the earnings distri-
bution and at earnings volatility by job change and by sector. There are some
other results of interest in Table 4.2, including the absence of significant differ-
ences in the volatility of residual earnings across education groups or between
union and non-union workers. Many of these results are discussed in more
detail when I introduce the explanatory variables of interest in chapter 5.
4.2.1 Earnings volatility across the earnings distribution
One important result in Table 4.2 is that volatility of residual earnings is much
higher among the lowest earnings quintile than among any other quintile. This
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is not a new finding (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994), but it is worth emphasizing,
because it implies that the difference in welfare between high and low earners
is understated if earnings volatility is not taken into account.
Figure 4.6 illustrates this clearly by showing mean volatility of residual
earnings by ventile (five-percentile bins) of earnings, in the initial and final
years of my sample. It is clear that, in both years, volatility of residual earn-
ings is greater for low earners than for high earners. Another interesting result
in this figure is that, while earnings volatility rose between 1975 and 2005 at
almost all earnings ventiles, the increase was largest in the bottom fifth of the
earnings distribution. That suggests that the welfare gap between low and high
earners grew even more than would be suggested by the well-documented in-
crease in cross-sectional earnings inequality (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008).
To quantify how the welfare losses from earnings volatility differ across
the earnings distribution and over time, I compare observed earnings and cer-
tainty equivalent earnings for workers in each earnings quintile, separately for
the initial and final years of my sample. I assume constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility functions with parameter θ = 2.2 To measure certainty equiv-
alent earnings for workers in a given quintile, I first compute expected utility
if earnings follow a lognormal distribution, with the mean and variance of log
earnings chosen to be typical of the earnings quintile. The most natural mean
to choose for this log earnings distribution is median log earnings within the
earnings quintile in the specified year. For the variance of the distribution, I
use the mean of earnings volatility within the earnings quintile in the specified
year (recall that worker-specific earnings volatility, by my preferred measure,
is a variance, so the cross-worker mean represents a typical variance of resid-
2Estimates of this parameter vary, with plenty of widely-cited evidence for somewhat lower
(Chetty, 2006) and higher (Barsky et al., 1997) values.
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Figure 4.6: Volatility of residual earnings by earnings ventile
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). The fitted values from these profiles are used to identify
earnings ventiles for each year. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see
chapter 3 for details.
ual log earnings within the earnings quintile). Certainty equivalent earnings is
the level of earnings that, with zero earnings volatility, would yield the same
amount of utility as the expected utility just described. The difference between
observed median earnings and certainty equivalent earnings is the amount that
the worker at the median of the earnings quintile would be willing to pay to
reduce earnings volatility to zero.
For this exercise, I assume that workers consume exactly what they earn in
each period. This assumption is unrealistic in many cases, but it will not affect
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comparisons of welfare losses over time, and it will give a lower bound on
differences in welfare losses across earnings quintiles if, as seems likely, lower
earners find it more difficult to smooth consumption in the face of volatile
earnings (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston, 2008). In reality, it may be more
accurate to assume that lower earners have greater risk aversion, because they
have more limited or expensive access to consumption smoothing through the
financial system. In this case, the welfare losses among low earners, for a given
level of earnings volatility, would be higher than the values I report here.
Table 4.3 shows the results of this exercise. In 1975, the median worker in
the lowest quintile of earnings would be willing to pay about 3 percent of earn-
ings to eliminate volatility of residual earnings, while the median worker in the
highest quintile of earnings would pay about 1 percent. Between 1975 and 2005,
willingness to pay increases at each quintile, and the increase is largest among
the lowest earnings. By 2005, the median worker in the first earnings quintile
would be willing to pay almost 6 percent of earnings to eliminate volatility of
residual earnings.
4.2.2 Earnings volatility by job change and by sector
A fundamental question about the increase in economy-wide volatility of resid-
ual earnings is to what extent it reflects changes in the incidence and conse-
quences of job change, and to what extent it is a result of changing pay setting
within jobs. This subsection discusses some raw descriptive evidence on this
topic, and I address the issue more closely in chapter 5.
If job change is the reason for rising economy-wide volatility of residual
earnings, the proximate causes can be more frequent job change, more earn-
ings volatility among job changers, or both. After discussing in chapter 3 the
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PSID data I use, I presented in Table 3.1 means of the variables used in this
dissertation, for the full sample period and four sub-periods. The top of the
table shows that at the beginning of the sample period, in nine-year windows
centered on 1975 to 1981, just under half of all workers experienced any job
change. For the last sub-period, nine-year windows centered on 1999 to 2005,
the fraction experiencing no job change over the window actually rose a few
percentage points. Incidence of voluntary job change also increased a few per-
centage points, while incidence of involuntary job change (due to establishment
closing or layoff) decreased.
Turning now to the amount of volatility of residual earnings experienced by
job stayers and job changers, the results in Table 4.2 show that, not surprisingly,
job changers experience higher volatility of residual earnings than job stayers.
For job stayers, mean volatility of residual earnings rose by 0.021 between the
first and last sub-periods of my sample, which is just under the economy-
wide increase of 0.025. Voluntary job changes are associated with less earnings
volatility than involuntary job changes, so the shift toward more voluntary
changes and fewer involuntary changes would tend to decrease economy-wide
volatility of residual earnings. Overall, the incidence and consequences of job
change do not appear to be strong proximate explanations for rising earnings
volatility.
Another class of explanations for rising economy-wide volatility of residual
earnings involves changes in pay setting within jobs. One clue to such changes
might be found in whether earnings volatility rose at different rates in differ-
ent occupation or industry sectors. Table 4.2 shows mean volatility of resid-
ual earnings for eight occupation categories and six industry categories, for
the full sample period and four sub-periods. There are significant differences
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across occupations and industries for the full period and for most sub-periods.
Mean earnings volatility rose between the first and last sub-periods for all cat-
egories, but there is no clear pattern to the increases. For example, managers
experienced a below-average increase (0.021 versus 0.025), while professionals
experienced the largest increase (0.062).
These results are for all workers, including those who changed jobs dur-
ing the nine-year window over which earnings volatility is measured. To get
cleaner evidence on pay setting within jobs across occupation and industry
sectors, in Table 4.4 I restrict the sample to nine-year windows in which the
worker did not change jobs. It is still the case that there are significant dif-
ferences across occupations and industries for the full period and for most
sub-periods. Most occupation and industry categories experienced an increase
in volatility of residual earnings between the first and last sub-periods but,
again, there is no clear pattern to the increases.
4.3 Effects of measurement choices
This section assesses the empirical importance of each of the four methodologi-
cal issues discussed in chapter 2: when risk is the motivation for studying earn-
ings volatility, volatility of residual earnings is more interesting than volatility
of total earnings, life cycle earnings profiles should not absorb aggregate shocks
that appear as volatility to workers, the profiles should absorb heterogeneous
earnings trends, and volatility measures should be based on variances of resid-
ual earnings or squared changes in residual earnings, rather than on standard
deviations of residual earnings or absolute changes in residual earnings.
There are two ways in which each of these methodological issues can be
empirically meaningful. First, the methodological choices may change the time
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series of economy-wide earnings volatility, affecting the extent to which volatil-
ity increased or even whether it increased. Second, these issues may affect
comparisons of earnings volatility across workers. This is important both be-
cause a number of researchers are interested in such comparisons (Gottschalk
and Moffitt, 1994; Stevens, 2001; Drewianka, 2010; Strain, 2011; Ziliak, Hardy,
and Bollinger, 2011) and because such comparisons are the basis for the my de-
composition approach in chapter 5 to studying why economy-wide earnings
volatility increased.
Therefore, I show the effect that each of my methodological recommenda-
tions has both on the change in economy-wide earnings volatility over time and
on three comparisons of earnings volatility across workers. The cross-worker
results use regressions in which the dependent variable is the log of earn-
ings volatility, and I use three correlates that have been discussed in previous
research: a worker’s age or potential experience, job change, and the unem-
ployment rate.3 (I use log earnings volatility rather than the level of earnings
volatility because some of the changes I consider alter the scale of the volatility
measure.)
A final subsection takes up a secondary issue raised by one of my recom-
mendations: if life cycle earnings profiles are to include heterogeneous earn-
ings trends, for how many periods do workers need to be observed in order to
obtain sufficiently accurate estimates of these trends?
3In chapter 5, I include a quadratic in the unemployment rate in all earnings volatility
regressions, to account for the fact that large deviations from typical unemployment rates,
whether high or low, may be associated with abnormal earnings changes. However, for sim-
plicity and for comparison with previous literature, in this chapter I do not include the square
of the unemployment rate.
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4.3.1 Volatility of residual earnings and total earnings
As I argued in chapter 2, when risk is the motivation for studying earnings
volatility, volatility of residual earnings is more conceptually sound than volatil-
ity of total earnings, because earnings changes explained by a life cycle earn-
ings profile are likely to be anticipated by workers. Here I compare my pre-
ferred measure of the volatility of residual earnings to a similar measure of the
volatility of total earnings. I measure the volatility of a worker’s total earnings
in a given year as the variance of the worker’s log earnings observations within
the nine-year interval centered at that year. This is simply equation (2.2) with
log earnings, y, in place of residual log earnings, e.
Figure 4.7 shows how economy-wide volatility of residual and total earn-
ings compare over time. Volatility of total earnings is larger, which is sensible
because volatility of total earnings includes life cycle earnings changes, while
volatility of residual earnings excludes such changes. However, the basic pat-
tern of each type of volatility over time is similar, and the distance between the
two does not vary much over time. For the full sample period, both types of
volatility increased roughly the same amount.
The first panel of Table 4.5 shows how some cross-worker comparisons of
earnings volatility differ depending on whether volatility of residual earnings
or volatility of total earnings is measured. When volatility of total earnings
is measured instead of volatility of residual earnings, earnings volatility de-
creases more with potential experience, because earnings variability due to life
cycle dynamics is larger for young workers, who are on a steep portion of the
earnings-experience profile, than for old workers, who are on a flatter portion
of the profile. The difference in earnings volatility between job changers and
job stayers is slightly larger when volatility of total earnings is measured, and
58
Figure 4.7: Economy-wide volatility of residual earnings and total earnings
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
specified in equation (2.1). A worker’s volatility of total earnings is computed using
log earnings rather than residual log earnings. Economy-wide volatility in a given
year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of household
in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
this change is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Finally, the asso-
ciation between earnings volatility and the unemployment rate appears much
smaller when volatility of total earnings is measured.
4.3.2 Aggregate shocks
I argued in chapter 2 that life cycle earnings profiles should not absorb aggre-
gate shocks, which are unlikely to be anticipated by workers. This means it
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Table 4.5: Effects of some methodological choices on cross-worker comparisons
of earnings volatility
Dependent variable: log of earnings volatility
Coefficient on Coefficient on Coefficient on
potential indicator of unemployment
experience job change rate in state
Volatility of residual earnings −0.023 1.325 0.063
(0.002) (0.054) (0.016)
Volatility of total earnings −0.035 1.406 0.032
(0.002) (0.054) (0.017)
p-value of test of equal coef. 0.000 0.048 0.018
Profiles: Smoothly varying coef. −0.023 1.325 0.063
(0.002) (0.054) (0.016)
Profiles: Year-specific coef. −0.017 1.201 0.033
(0.002) (0.055) (0.017)
p-value of test of equal coef. 0.001 0.000 0.013
Profiles: Worker fixed effects −0.026 1.392 0.036
(0.002) (0.054) (0.017)
Profiles: Cross-sections −0.024 1.366 0.031
(0.002) (0.053) (0.016)
p-value of test of equal coef. 0.101 0.181 0.480
Profiles: Worker-specific trends −0.023 1.325 0.063
(0.002) (0.054) (0.016)
Profiles: Common trends −0.026 1.392 0.036
(0.002) (0.054) (0.017)
p-value of test of equal coef. 0.061 0.052 0.017
Volatility: Variance of residuals −0.023 1.325 0.063
(0.002) (0.054) (0.016)
Volatility: Std. dev. of residuals −0.011 0.662 0.031
(0.001) (0.027) (0.008)
p-value of test of equal coef. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Within panels of the table, each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include year indicators. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Preferred measure of a worker’s earnings volatility in a given year is the variance of the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year
window centered on that year; see equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile, specified in equation (2.1). Each
panel modifies one aspect of this measurement process as indicated. Sample is male heads of household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
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is better to force the parameters of the profiles to change smoothly over time,
rather than estimating them separately for each year.
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of this change on economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings over time. The solid line plots economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings by year after estimating my preferred life cycle earnings spec-
ification with smoothly varying coefficients, and the dotted line plots volatility
after estimating profiles with the same regressors but year-specific coefficients.
The two series are almost identical, suggesting this issue will not affect conclu-
sions about the extent to which economy-wide earnings volatility has increased
over time.
The second panel of Table 4.5 shows that although the trend in economy-
wide earnings volatility is not affected by this issue, comparisons of earnings
volatility across workers are. When the life cycle profiles are estimated with
year-specific coefficients, volatility of residual earnings declines more gradu-
ally as a worker’s career advances, and the difference in volatility of residual
earnings between job changers and job stayers does not appear as large. Both of
these differences are statistically significant. Most strikingly, when the life cycle
profiles absorb aggregate shocks, the apparent association between volatility of
residual earnings and state-specific unemployment rates is only half as large.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous earnings trends
My preferred method of measuring earnings volatility involves a life cycle
earnings profile that includes worker fixed effects and worker-specific earnings
trends. The natural way to investigate the effects of these heterogeneous trends
is to compare volatility of residual earnings based on profiles with heteroge-
neous trends to volatility based on profiles that include worker fixed effects
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Figure 4.8: Effect of absorbing aggregate shocks in life cycle profiles on
economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
which modifies equation (2.1) as specified in the legend. Economy-wide volatility in
a given year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of
household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
but not worker-specific trends. However, previous studies of volatility of resid-
ual earnings do not even include worker fixed effects in the life cycle earnings
profiles. So there are two steps from the existing literature to my preferred
specification, and each may affect the measurement of earnings volatility. First,
adding worker fixed effects may change coefficients in the potential experi-
ence polynomial, and therefore change the earnings residuals. Second, further
adding heterogeneous earnings trends will change the series of log earnings
residuals obtained for each worker.
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Figure 4.9: Effect of life cycle earnings profiles estimated on cross-sections on
economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
.04
.045
.05
.055
.06
.065
Ec
on
om
y-
w
id
e v
ol
ati
lit
y
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Life cycle profiles estimated using fixed effects
Life cycle profiles estimated without fixed effects
Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
which modifies equation (2.1) as specified in the legend. Economy-wide volatility in
a given year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of
household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
Figure 4.9 shows economy-wide volatility of residual earnings over time
depending on whether worker fixed effects are included in the life cycle pro-
files. The two series are nearly identical. The third panel of Table 4.5 shows
that comparisons of volatility of residual earnings across workers are also not
affected by this issue: the changes to some regression coefficients of interest
are small and statistically insignificant.
The inclusion of heterogeneous earnings trends is empirically more impor-
tant than the inclusion of worker fixed effects alone. Figure 4.10 shows that
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economy-wide volatility of residual earnings grew by 73 percent between 1975
and 2005 when worker-specific trends are included in the life cycle profiles,
but 53 percent when the heterogeneous trends are omitted. Excluding the het-
erogeneous trends also causes the associations of volatility of residual earnings
with both potential experience and job change to be larger, as shown in the
fourth panel of Table 4.5, but the differences are small and not statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. Omitting the trends has a larger effect on
the relationship between volatility of residual earnings and the unemployment
rate, causing the observed association to be cut almost in half.
4.3.4 Functional form choice
I provided a justification in chapter 2 for earnings volatility measures based
on variances or squared changes instead of standard deviations or absolute
changes. To assess the empirical importance of this issue, I compare my pre-
ferred measure, the variance of a worker’s residual log earnings observations
over a nine-year period, to a different measure, the standard deviation of the
same residuals.
Figure 4.11 shows that the functional form choice is empirically very impor-
tant. By the variance measure, economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
increased 73 percent between 1975 and 2005. By the standard deviation mea-
sure, economy-wide volatility of residual earnings increased only 29 percent
over the same period.
Table 4.5 shows that the functional form also has a large effect on compar-
isons of volatility across workers. When the standard deviation is used instead
of the variance, the associations of volatility of residual earnings with potential
experience, job change, and the unemployment rate all decrease by about half,
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Figure 4.10: Effect of omitting heterogeneous earnings trends from life cycle
profiles on economy-wide volatility of residual earnings
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance of
the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year window centered on that year; see
equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals from a life cycle earnings profile,
which modifies equation (2.1) as specified in the legend. Economy-wide volatility in
a given year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of
household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
and each difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
4.3.5 Panel length and heterogeneous earnings trends
The issue of heterogeneous trends in the life cycle earnings profiles raises the
question of how many earnings observations are needed in order to obtain a
good estimate of a worker’s trend. The problem is that processes other than
the heterogeneous trends can also create steadily rising or falling earnings over
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Figure 4.11: Effect of functional form choice on economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings
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Notes: A worker’s volatility of residual earnings in a given year is the variance or
standard deviation, as indicated, of the worker’s earnings residuals during a nine-year
window centered on that year; see equation (2.2). The earnings residuals are residuals
from a life cycle earnings profile, specified in equation (2.1). Economy-wide volatility
in a given year is the mean of workers’ volatility in that year. Sample is male heads of
household in the PSID; see chapter 3 for details.
a short period. For example, the fading of a positive shock in an AR(1) process
would appear as a negative earnings trend. If a worker is followed for only
a few years, it is impossible to distinguish this from the worker’s life cycle
earnings trend. The fading of the shock would be absorbed by a bad estimate
of the worker’s earnings trend, and the worker’s estimated volatility would be
too low.
My preferred measure of earnings volatility, WA9, is ill-suited to studying
this issue, because by definition it requires a worker to be observed at least five
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times (every two years over a nine-year period). For this subsection, I adopt
a shorter measure from the same class: WA3 is the variance of the worker’s
residual log earnings during a window containing three time periods, instead
of nine time periods as in my preferred measure. This shorter window will
contain two biannual observations, and I will assign the volatility to the latter
of these observations. Using the discussion of this measure in chapter 2, one
way to express the WA3 measure is
VWA3it =
(eit − ei,t−2)2
2
. (4.4)
To determine how long a worker should be followed for the purpose of mea-
suring earnings volatility, I compute quantities of interest, such as economy-
wide earnings volatility, for panels of different lengths. However, as the panel
length requirement is shortened, the composition of the sample may change.
For example, workers who move geographically may have high earnings volatil-
ity and be more likely to drop out of the survey after only a few observations.
To exclude this type of composition shift, I begin with a single sample of
workers observed for ten consecutive surveys. (If the worker was observed
beyond ten surveys, I keep only the first ten observations.) I compute life cy-
cle earnings profiles, including heterogeneous earnings trends, for this sample,
then compute the statistics of interest, such as economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity. Then, I drop the final observation for each worker, leaving panels of nine
observations. I repeat estimation of the life cycle profiles and the statistics of
interest.
I proceed to drop observations—alternating between dropping the last and
first remaining observations—and repeat the estimations, stopping after the
panels are shortened to three observations. (For panels of just two observa-
tions, the life cycle profiles that include heterogeneous trends will perfectly
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fit the earnings observations, so that measured volatility is zero.) This process
simulates the effects of shortening the minimum panel requirement while leav-
ing the sample unchanged. The initial restriction to panels of ten consecutive
observations leaves only 706 workers. To check the robustness of my findings
to other initial restrictions, and to see whether a larger sample changes the
conclusions, I repeat the entire process with progressively shorter initial panel
restrictions, from nine to four.
Table 4.6 shows how the heterogeneous earnings trends behave as the pan-
els are shortened. Each row marks an initial panel length restriction, and the
columns mark progressively shorter panels from that initial sample. The cells
plot the mean difference between the trend computed from the restricted panel
and the trend computed from the unrestricted panel. More specifically, let δˆPi
denote the estimated earnings trend for worker i for the initial panel length
requirement P, and let δˆRi be the estimated earnings trend when the panel is
shortened to length R. Then the cells plot 1N ∑
N
i=1
∣∣δˆRi − δˆPi ∣∣.
First consider the initial panel length requirement of ten observations (P =
10). When these panels are artificially shortened to nine observations (R = 9),
the average magnitude of the resulting changes in estimated earnings trends
is just 0.006, so that changes in residual log earnings would be misstated by
0.6 percent on average. This error increases steadily through R = 5, after
which the size of the error accelerates until it is 4.4 percent when the panels
are shortened to three observations. The findings are similar if the initial panel
length requirement is lowered (P = 9, 8, . . . , 4).
Table 4.7 shows how economy-wide volatility of residual earnings, by my
preferred measure, changes as panel length requirements are reduced. At an
initial requirement of ten observations, economy-wide earnings volatility is
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0.040. As the panels in this sample are artificially shortened, the estimate of
economy-wide earnings volatility is surprisingly stable, falling to 0.037 at R =
5 and 0.036 at R = 4 before dropping to 0.031 at R = 3. For lower initial panel
length requirements, the findings are similar: the estimate of economy-wide
volatility is fairly stable through R = 5 and experiences a large drop when
moving from R = 4 to R = 3.
Finally, Table 4.8 shows how one comparison of volatility of residual earn-
ings across workers is affected by the panel length requirement. The statistic
of interest in this table is the coefficient from a regression of the log of earnings
volatility on an indicator of job change, so the cells in the table are estimates of
the proportional difference in volatility of residual earnings between job chang-
ers and job stayers. At an initial panel length requirement of ten observations,
the difference is 1.202. The difference remains quite stable—between 1.114 and
1.207—as the panels are artificially shortened to a length of R = 4, but then
drops to 0.964 when the panels are shortened to three observations. The large
change between R = 4 and R = 3 is seen for some, but not all, of the other
initial panel length requirements, although the estimates are noisy.
Taken as a whole, these exercises suggest workers should be followed for
at least four time periods in order to obtain a “good enough” estimate of their
heterogeneous earnings trend. It is important to remember that in my PSID
sample, observations are two years apart, because the PSID switched to bian-
nual interviews after 1997. I chose to drop interviews for all previous even-
numbered years rather than worry about the issues created by this change.
Therefore, workers with four consecutive observations were interviewed six
years apart, which is longer than workers can be followed in the SIPP or CPS,
two data sources commonly used in the earnings volatility literature.
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CHAPTER 5
ACCOUNTING FOR INCREASING EARNINGS VOLATILITY
This chapter examines the reasons for rising economy-wide volatility of
residual earnings among men in the U.S., using my preferred measure of
volatility. Section 5.1 reviews previous research on this topic. In section 5.2, I
develop decomposition methods to measure the contributions of various mech-
anisms to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility. I treat the change
over the entire period, 1975 to 2005, as the sum of a series of two-year changes,
and perform one decomposition for each two-year change. To find the contri-
bution of a given mechanism to the change in economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity over the full period, I total that mechanism’s contribution to each of the
two-year changes. There are two advantages to this approach. First, if a mech-
anism contributed to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility, I can
see whether this contribution was concentrated within a short time period or
spread out over the full sample period. Second, I can relax the assumption
that the relationship between earnings volatility and the explanatory variables
is constant over time.
In section 5.3, I discuss the mechanisms I consider as candidates to explain
rising economy-wide earnings volatility. The most important of these is shocks
to labor demand. I construct a demand shock index to capture the exposure of
a worker’s demographic group to national changes in the occupation-industry
distribution of hours worked. Using yearly CPS data, I compute the variance
of log hours worked within each occupation-industry sector for each nine-year
volatility window. To measure a worker’s exposure to these demand shocks,
I define the demand shock index for a given window as a weighted average
of the sector-specific shocks, where the weights are provided by the sector
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employment distribution for the worker’s sex, education category, and state.
Intuitively, a demand shock for managers in the finance industry will raise the
demand shock index more for college graduates in New York than for college
graduates in Arkansas, and more for college graduates in New York than for
low-education workers in New York.
Section 5.4 presents my results. I present both unconditional results, using
a separate decomposition for each mechanism, and conditional results, with all
mechanisms included in a single decomposition. My primary finding is that
much of the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility is due to the fact that
workers have become exposed over time to larger or more frequent demand
shocks in the labor market. This mechanism explains about half of the increase
in economy-wide earnings volatility in both unconditional and conditional de-
compositions. I show that the association between earnings volatility and the
demand shock index is statistically significant across a range of specifications,
and remains statistically significant when using only about a quarter of the
sample to account for concerns about precision that arise from observations
that use overlapping nine-year windows. I also show that the role of demand
shocks is robust to a number of alternative measurement strategies, such as re-
moving sector-specific demand trends before constructing the shock index and
defining a worker’s labor market by sector instead of demographic group.
In light of previous literature that has tied rising economy-wide earnings
volatility to job and occupation mobility, I explore the contributions of job and
occupation change to rising economy-wide earnings volatility in three ways.
First, I measure the unconditional explanatory power of job change indicators
and find that job change predicts small decreases in economy-wide earnings
volatility over my sample period. Second, I assess the explanatory power of
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firm, occupation, and industry tenure, both unconditionally and conditional
on other variables. If job, occupation, or industry change has become more
frequent, the distributions of these tenure variables will shift toward zero. Be-
cause low-tenure workers have higher earnings volatility, such a shift could
explain part of the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility over time. I
find that the explanatory power of the tenure variables is very small in all of
the decompositions. Finally, I analyze the extent to which job change mediates
the relationship between demand shocks and earnings volatility. For exam-
ple, demand shocks could affect earnings volatility only through job change,
or demand shocks could be associated with more frequent job change even as
overall job change rates are roughly constant. I find limited and quantitatively
insignificant support for these possibilities.
5.1 Previous research
Previous research has found links between earnings volatility and job loss
(Stevens, 2001), the unemployment rate (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994; Stevens,
2001), firm revenue volatility (Comin, Groshen, and Rabin, 2009), firm employ-
ment level volatility (Strain, 2011), and AFQT score (Strain, 2011). I include
these factors in my analysis to the extent my data allows.
A few authors have attempted to explain rising economy-wide earnings
volatility, either as its own phenomenon or as part of a broader set of facts.
However, no study has used worker-level data to account for increasing economy-
wide earnings volatility, and no study has tested alternative explanations for
the trend. Comin, Groshen, and Rabin (2009), using COMPUSTAT data, find
that volatility of firms’ average wages rose by 7.5 percentage points between
1970 and 1999 due to rising firm revenue volatility. Using the most compara-
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ble PSID sample, economy-wide earnings volatility rose 2.7 percentage points
over the same period. This must be viewed as a very rough accounting. The
COMPUSTAT data covers only publicly traded firms, which have more volatile
revenue than privately held firms (Davis et al., 2007), and 80 to 85 percent of
firms do not report wage data (Pistaferri, 2009). Therefore, the workers in the
resulting sample may be very unrepresentative of the PSID sample. Moreover,
fluctuations in firms’ average wages can come from two sources: wage changes
for existing workers, and hires and separations that change the average wage.
Violante (2002) studies theoretically the role of accelerating technical change.
Workers learn by doing on the job and endogenously separate from jobs in an
attempt to be paired with the newest, most productive machines. As the rate
of technical change grows, the technical distance between newer and older ma-
chines grows, so there are larger wage changes for those who change jobs.
Job stayers experience faster wage growth: assuming that learning profiles on
the job are concave, then as technical change accelerates, workers joining a
new job carry over less skill from the old job, so they start the new job at a
lower, steeper part of the learning profile. Therefore, both job stayers and job
changers contribute to rising economy-wide earnings volatility. In a calibration
exercise, accelerating technical change can explain most of the observed rise in
economy-wide earnings volatility.
One implication of this model is that the rate of job change is weakly in-
creasing in the rate of technical change. Increasing job change is also important
in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009a), which builds and calibrates a model to
explain rising occupational mobility and increasing wage inequality. The au-
thors note that the productivity shocks that drive the primary results in the
paper also predict rising economy-wide earnings volatility.
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5.2 Decomposing changes earnings volatility
I use decompositions to quantify the effects of various mechanisms on the
change over time in economy-wide volatility of residual earnings. Because
volatility of residual earnings is the only type of earnings volatility studied in
this chapter, I do not use the “residual” modifier below. Also, earnings volatil-
ity is consistently measured using my preferred method, window averaging
using nine-year intervals, which was detailed in chapter 2. Therefore, I drop
the WA9 superscript when denoting earnings volatility. Worker-specific earn-
ings volatility is denoted Vit. Economy-wide earnings volatility is denoted Vt
and always refers to the mean of workers’ earnings volatilities in the specified
year.
The quantity to be decomposed is the change over the full sample period in
economy-wide earnings volatility, V2005−V1975. Each mechanism m = 1, . . . , M
is associated with explanatory variables xm. In a traditional Oaxaca decomposi-
tion of the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between the initial and
final years, the contribution of mechanism m to the change is (xm2005− xm1975)βˆm,
where βˆm is estimated from a regression of earnings volatility on xm and pos-
sibly other variables.
There are two disadvantages to this approach in the current setting. First,
while this simple decomposition can identify whether some mechanism con-
tributed to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility over time, it cannot
say when that contribution was made—for example, abruptly over a short time
period or gradually over the full sample period. Second, it forces the relation-
ship between earnings volatility and the explanatory variables to be constant
over time.
To address these issues, I treat the total change in economy-wide earnings
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volatility, V2005 − V1975, as the sum of a series of two-year changes, beginning
with V1977 − V1975 and ending with V2005 − V2003, and perform one decompo-
sition for each two-year change. To find the contribution of a mechanism to
the change in economy-wide earnings volatility from 1975 to 2005, I total that
mechanism’s contribution to each of the two-year changes. By splitting the 30-
year change into two-year changes, it is possible to identify the timing of contri-
butions to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility, and the assumption
of time-invariant coefficients in the underlying regressions can be relaxed by
allowing the coefficients to vary across the two-year decompositions.
I begin with OLS regressions of earnings volatility, which is measured at
the worker-year level, on explanatory variables and year indicators:
Vit =
M
∑
m=1
xmit βm(t) + αt + εit. (5.1)
In one set of decompositions, the coefficients in the underlying regressions are
constrained to be time-invariant:
βm(t) = βm. (5.2)
In a second set of decompositions, the coefficients are allowed to vary over
time. Year-specific coefficients would be too noisy given the limited sample
size available in each year, so I allow the coefficients to change over time along
a quadratic path:
βm(t) = β0m + β1mt+ β2mt2. (5.3)
The decompositions of the change in economy-wide earnings volatility be-
tween 1975 and 2005 are performed by summing up the two-year decomposi-
tions. The two-year changes in the means of the explanatory variables are mul-
tiplied by the regression coefficients from the midpoint year of the two-year
decomposition. These midpoint year coefficients exist because the coefficients
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are either assumed to be time-invariant or to vary as a smooth function of time,
so they are defined for any year during the sample. Let δˆmt,t+2 denote the con-
tribution of mechanism m to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility
in one of the two-year decompositions, and let ∆ˆm denote the contribution of
mechanism m to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility over the full
sample period. Then
∆ˆm = δˆm1975,1977 + · · ·+ δˆm2003,2005
= (xm1977 − xm1975)βˆm(1976) + · · ·+ (xm2005 − xm2003)βˆm(2004).
(5.4)
To complete a full description of the decompositions, first consider the de-
compositions of two-year changes. Denote the portion of the change due to
changing coefficients associated with mechanism m by δˆβmt,t+2, and the portion
due to changes in the year indicators by δˆαt,t+2. Then the decomposition of the
first two-year change in economy-wide earnings volatility is
V1977 −V1975 =
M
∑
m=1
(xm1977 − xm1975)βˆm(1976)
+
M
∑
m=1
[
xm1977
(
βˆm(1977)− βˆm(1976)
)
+ xm1975
(
βˆm(1976)− βˆm(1975)
)]
+ (αˆ1977 − αˆ1975)
=
M
∑
m=1
δˆm1975,1977 +
M
∑
m=1
δˆ
βm
1975,1977 + δˆ
α
1975,1977.
(5.5)
For the long decomposition, let ∆ˆβm = δˆβm1975,1977 + · · ·+ δˆβm2003,2005 be the con-
tribution of changing coefficients associated with mechanism m to the change
in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005, and let ∆ˆα =
δˆα1975,1977 + · · ·+ δˆα2003,2005 = αˆ2005− αˆ1975 be the contribution of the year indica-
tors. Then the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and
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2005 can be decomposed into a portion explained by changes in the explana-
tory variables, an unexplained portion due to changes in the coefficients, and
an unexplained portion due to changes in the year indicators. Using the above
definitions and the template provided by equation (5.5), the decomposition of
the 30-year change is
V2005 −V1975 = (V2005 −V2003) + · · ·+ (V1977 −V1975)
=
M
∑
m=1
[
δˆm2003,2005 + · · ·+ δˆm1975,1977
]
+
M
∑
m=1
[
δˆ
βm
2003,2005 + · · ·+ δˆβm1975,1977
]
+ δˆα2003,2005 + · · ·+ δˆα1975,1977
=
M
∑
m=1
∆ˆm +
M
∑
m=1
∆ˆβm + ∆ˆα.
(5.6)
The above discussion applies to the case in which all of the mechanisms,
m = 1, . . . , M, are included in the underlying volatility regression (5.1). I call
decompositions based on this multiple regression conditional decompositions,
emphasizing the presence of multiple mechanisms. To assess the uncondi-
tional explanatory power of individual mechanisms, I also present uncondi-
tional decompositions, in which only one mechanism is included in the underly-
ing volatility regression. In this case, the applicable versions of equations (5.1),
(5.5), and (5.6) do not include the summation ∑Mm=1.
The usual concern about inconsistency of the OLS estimates of βm(t) in
equation (5.1) applies. As a motivating example in the context of earnings
volatility, consider measurement error. Suppose the variance of earnings mea-
surement error differs across workers and that the variance is correlated with
worker characteristics. Duncan and Hill (1985), Bound et al. (1994), and Pis-
chke (1995) provide evidence that earnings measurement error is correlated
with worker characteristics using the PSID survey instrument. Because earn-
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ings measurement error contributes to observed earnings volatility, this pro-
duces a worker-specific effect in an earnings volatility regression that appears
in the error term in equation (5.1) and is correlated with explanatory variables
in that model, making OLS estimates of βm(t) biased and inconsistent.
To address this, I use repeated earnings volatility observations to estimate
a modification of equation (5.1) that includes worker fixed effects:
Vit =
M
∑
m=1
xmit β˜m(t) + γi + α˜t + ε˜it. (5.7)
The decomposition (5.6) must be altered because the change in economy-wide
earnings volatility, V2005 − V1975, is now affected by entry to and exit from
the sample over time through the worker fixed effects. Denote the average
estimated worker effect in year t by γt. Then the additional term γ2005−γ1975 =
∆ˆγ belongs on the right hand side of equation (5.6) when the worker fixed
effects specification is used as the underlying regression.
The fixed effects approach is conceptually more attractive than the OLS ap-
proach, but the fixed effects method has some disadvantages in the context
of this chapter. First, measures of earnings volatility are already quite noisy,
and worker fixed effects further remove useful variation in earnings volatility.
Second, in the empirical results below, I discuss the concern that many of the
windows over which earnings volatility is measured overlap. To address a pos-
sible consequence—artificially small standard errors when earnings volatility
is regressed on covariates—I restrict the sample to earnings volatility observa-
tions with non-overlapping windows. This leaves too few earnings volatility
observations per worker to implement fixed effects earnings volatility regres-
sions. Because of these issues, I give equal weight to decomposition results
based on OLS and fixed effects regressions, and fortunately the major results
are not sensitive to the estimation method.
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Both because of the number of results generated and because the detailed
“unexplained portions” of the decompositions have no natural interpretation,
I present in the results only the explained changes in economy-wide earnings
volatility, ∆ˆm. These terms are compared to the change in economy-wide earn-
ings volatility, V2005 −V1975, to assess the explanatory power of mechanism m.
5.3 Mechanisms
In this section I discuss the mechanisms to be assessed. Variables associated
with earnings volatility, and for which the mean has changed over time, may
have some explanatory power for the change in economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity. As far as possible, I include each mechanism that has been linked in
previous literature to the levels of workers’ earnings volatility or changes in
economy-wide earnings volatility. The mechanisms and explanatory variables
are listed in Table 5.1, and summary statistics for both the full sample and four
sub-periods are presented in Table 3.1. Overall, these variables contain a good
deal of information on labor demand and on the characteristics of workers and
jobs, and less information on labor supply and labor market institutions.
Demand shocks
The U.S. has experienced major changes in the wage and occupation distribu-
tions over the past 40 years, with wages and employment falling in medium-
skilled routine work and rising in high-skill abstract work and low-skill service
work (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Autor and Dorn, 2012). The changes
did not occur smoothly, though. During the 1970s and 1980s, the changes were
monotonic: higher wage percentiles experienced better wage changes. But dur-
ing the following two decades, wage changes were most favorable among the
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Table 5.1: Variables to explain earnings volatility of worker i in year t
Mechanism Explanatory variable(s)
Demand shocks Weighted average of occupation-industry variances of log hours
worked during [t− 4, t+ 4] from CPS data, where weights are em-
ployment distribution specific to demographic group of worker i;
see text for details
Education 3 indicators of education of worker i: high school or less; some
college; college or more
Experience Potential experience of worker i in year t
Unemployment rate Quadratic in mean unemployment rate during [t − 4, t + 4] in
state worker i lived in as of year t− 4
Marriage Indicator of worker i being married in year t− 4
Union membership Indicator for union membership of worker i in year t− 4
Employer tenure Employer tenure of worker i in year t− 4
Occupation tenure Occupation tenure of worker i in year t− 4
Industry tenure Industry tenure of worker i in year t− 4
Occupation 8 indicators of occupation of worker i in year t − 4: managers;
professionals; technicians; sales; clerical, administrative; produc-
tion, craft, repair; operators, laborers; services
Industry 9 indicators of industry of worker i in year t − 4: agriculture,
extraction; construction; manufacturing; transportation, commu-
nication, utilities; wholesale trade, retail trade; finance, insurance,
real estate; business services; professional services; public admin-
istration
highest percentiles, but less favorable near the median than at the bottom of
the wage distribution (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Occupation categories also
experienced business cycle fluctuations differently: Jaimovich and Siu (2012)
show that the long-term employment decline in middle-skill occupations oc-
curred largely during recessions, while abstract and service occupations expe-
rienced comparatively slight employment decreases during downturns.
Following this literature, I interpret national changes in the occupation-
industry employment distribution as reflecting shifts in the demand for labor,
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rather than supply shifts that might occur because of changes in workers’ job
preferences. To capture the influence on earnings volatility of these changes in
labor demand, I create an index of demand shocks using CPS data on national
changes in the occupation-industry employment distribution.1 The measure
of demand shocks within an occupation-industry sector is the variance of log
hours worked in the sector over the same nine-year window that is used to
compute earnings volatility.
For each demographic group, I compute the initial distribution of hours
worked across occupation-industry sectors, using the first five years of the sam-
ple. I then define the demand shock index for the demographic group to be
the weighted average of the demand shock index for each occupation-industry
sector, where the weights are the sector employment mix specific to the demo-
graphic group. Workers are matched to the index based on their demographic
group at the beginning of the nine-year window. Intuitively, if there is a large
negative demand shock to manufacturing, the demand shock index increases
more for low-education workers in Ohio than for low-education workers in
Oregon, and more for low-education workers in Ohio than for college gradu-
ates in Ohio.
More precisely, let j index demographic groups formed by the intersection
of two sex categories, three education categories (high school or less, some
college, and college or more), and 51 states (including the District of Columbia).
Let k index sectors formed by the intersection of eight occupation categories
and six industry categories (listed in Table 5.1). Using annual March CPS data
for 1971–2009, let Ejτ be hours worked by demographic group j in year τ, let
1This approach modifies previous research that has constructed indices of demand shifts
from an initial to a final year, using national sectoral employment changes weighted by em-
ployment distributions specific to demographic groups. Examples include Katz and Murphy
(1992), Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel (2000), and Bound and Holzer (2000).
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Ekτ be hours worked in sector k in year τ, and let Ejkτ be hours worked by
demographic group j in sector k in year τ. Let Vkt be the variance of Ekτ over
the window [t− 4, t+ 4], and let αjk be the average of Ejkτ/Ejτ over the first five
years of the sample. The Vkt measure sector demand shifts over the window at
the national level, and the αjk describe the initial sector employment mixes of
demographic groups, with ∑k αjk = 1. Then the demand shock index is defined
to be
DVjt =∑
k
αjkVkt. (5.8)
The demand shock index could be constructed in other ways, reflecting
different assumptions about the labor market to which a worker belongs or
different measures of demand. Below, I discuss the relative merits of alternative
constructions of the demand shock index and show that my results are robust
to using these other constructions.
Education
Rising educational attainment is one of the most salient trends over the past 50
years in the U.S. labor market (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Table 4.2 shows
that mean earnings volatility is quantitatively similar across three education
categories—high school or less, some college, and college or more—for the
full sample period, and the null hypothesis of equality across groups cannot
be rejected. But the conditional relationship between education and earnings
volatility may be stronger. For example, workers of different skill levels may
experience different labor market conditions, as emphasized by the literature
on within-sector skill upgrading (Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998). Gottschalk
and Moffitt (1994) found some evidence of earnings volatility differences across
education categories, especially among job changers.
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Experience
If earnings volatility varies with age or experience, then changes in the demo-
graphic composition of the labor force would be expected to change the level
of economy-wide earnings volatility. Table 4.2 shows that older workers tend
to have lower earnings volatility than younger workers, likely because older
workers change jobs less often. That, in turn, could be due to an accumulation
of specific human capital or to having had longer to find a good worker-firm
match. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) also found that earnings volatility de-
clines with age.
Unemployment rate
Business cycle fluctuations might be expected to affect earnings volatility be-
cause of especially high or low earnings growth, or through especially high
or low job loss, although recessions are associated both with more job losses
and fewer job-to-job changes (Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger, 2012). Re-
call that the life cycle profile removes “typical” earnings growth trends before
earnings volatility is calculated. When labor markets are especially tight, un-
employment is low and earnings will tend to grow faster than usual; earnings
volatility may be higher than in typical business cycle conditions. Similarly,
earnings volatility could be high in times of especially high unemployment
rates, when earnings growth is low. To account for this possibly nonlinear ef-
fect, I include a quadratic in the mean unemployment rate in the worker’s state
as of year t− 4. Stevens (2001) finds a positive relationship between earnings
volatility and unemployment. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) find a positive re-
lationship only among involuntary job changers, with a negative relationship
among job stayers.
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Marriage
Married workers may have higher or lower earnings volatility than unmarried
workers. For married workers, the spouse’s human capital provides insurance
against earnings shocks, which reduces the utility cost of earnings volatility.
That leads married workers to be more accepting of earnings volatility. But
married workers may also be less willing or able to pursue opportunities that
require geographic moves; this will tend to reduce earnings volatility. Also,
many workers may wait to marry until after they have settled on a career path,
in which case earnings volatility will be lower for married than for non-married
workers, but with no causal relationship leading from marriage to earnings
volatility. Table 4.2 indicates that married men consistently have lower earnings
volatility than unmarried men, and marriage rates have been decreasing in the
U.S. (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). I include an indicator of marriage as of the
beginning of the nine-year earnings volatility window.
Union membership
Unionization rates have fallen steadily in the U.S. for over 50 years; union cov-
erage in my PSID sample of men fell from 25 percent in 1975 to 15 percent in
2005, and from 27 percent to 13 percent among private-sector workers. While
union contracts may smooth wage growth, rigid wages may in turn raise the
probability of layoffs at unionized firms (Medoff, 1979). Therefore the relation-
ship between earnings volatility and union membership is an empirical ques-
tion. To account for the effects of union membership, I include an indicator of
union membership as of the beginning of the nine-year window that is used
to compute earnings volatility. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) found earnings
volatility was higher among non-union workers than among union workers.
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Table 4.2 echoes this finding, although the difference is small, not statistically
significant, and inconsistent over time.
Occupation and industry
The industrial and occupational composition of the labor force changed signif-
icantly over my sample period (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Table 4.2 shows
that earnings volatility does differ across industry and occupation categories,
so these labor market trends could exert compositional effects on earnings
volatility apart from the demand shock effects discussed above. I include in-
dicators for eight occupations and nine industries, which are detailed in Table
5.1. The indicators are assigned as of the beginning of the nine-year window
that is used to compute earnings volatility.
Tenure
Specific human capital plays an important role in wage determination. Previ-
ous research has documented returns to firm-specific (Altonji and Shakotko,
1987), industry-specific (Parent, 2000), and occupation-specific (Kambourov
and Manovskii, 2009b) human capital, with a concave profile to the returns.
Table 4.2 confirms that earnings volatility tends to decrease as employer, occu-
pation, or industry tenure increases. To account for the effects of more frequent
job change or higher occupation or industry mobility on earnings volatility, I
include a measure of each of the three types of tenure—employer, industry, and
occupation—as of the beginning of the nine-year earnings volatility window.
As discussed in the introduction, this is one way to test existing explanations
for rising economy-wide earnings volatility.
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Other factors
Performance pay is an element of an increasing fraction of U.S. jobs (Lemieux,
MacLeod, and Parent, 2009). It is possible that earnings are more variable in
performance pay jobs, because output and thus pay depends partly on shocks
the worker cannot control. However, my labor earnings measure is wage and
salary earnings, which does not include performance pay.
Measurement error undoubtedly accounts for some of the residuals from
equation (2.1) that are used to compute earnings volatility. However, this does
not directly present a problem for studying the change in economy-wide earn-
ings volatility over time unless the structure of measurement error changes.
Duncan and Hill (1985), Bound et al. (1994), and Pischke (1995) have studied
measurement error in the PSID, but to my knowledge no studies have ex-
amined the change in measurement error over time, whether in the PSID or
any other survey. The PSID switched to computer-assisted interviewing in the
mid-1990s, so it is conceivable that the magnitude of measurement error has
decreased over time in this survey, in which case the rise in economy-wide
earnings volatility is even larger than it appears.
5.4 Results
This section presents the main results on why economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity has increased among males in the U.S. I begin with unconditional decompo-
sitions, in which the explanatory power of each mechanism for the increase in
economy-wide earnings volatility is measured separately without conditioning
on any other mechanisms. Labor demand shocks are by far the strongest ex-
planation unconditionally. Next, I discuss regression results and find that the
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effect of demand shocks on earnings volatility is robust to the inclusion of var-
ious sets of control variables and remains statistically significant when using a
subset of the sample to remove concerns about overlapping observations. Fol-
lowing this, I present conditional decompositions that quantify the explanatory
power of each mechanism when controlling for the others. Demand shocks ex-
plain about half of the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility in these
decompositions. I then explore the extent to which job change mediates the
relationship between demand shocks and earnings volatility. Finally, I show
that the decomposition results are robust to alternative constructions of the
demand shock index.
5.4.1 Unconditional decompositions
Because my primary question is why economy-wide earnings volatility in-
creased, in lieu of presenting unconditional regression results, I perform un-
conditional decompositions of the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility
for each mechanism discussed above. These decompositions answer the follow-
ing question: Given the unconditional relationship between earnings volatil-
ity and mechanism m, how much of the increase in economy-wide earnings
volatility over the sample period can be explained by mechanism m? For each
decomposition, the covariates used in the regression on which the decompo-
sition is based are the explanatory variables associated with the mechanism,
which are detailed above and summarized in Table 5.1, and a full set of year
indicators.
Table 5.2 presents the results for decompositions based on OLS regres-
sions, in which each row represents one decomposition using time-invariant
coefficients and one decomposition using coefficients allowed to vary along a
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quadratic path over time (equation (5.3)). Demand shocks have the greatest
explanatory power for the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility, ac-
counting for more than 40 percent of the change between 1975 and 2005 in
each specification. Given the relationship between earnings volatility and un-
employment, the downward trend in the unemployment rate over the sample
period predicts a decrease in economy-wide earnings volatility.2 Changes in
marriage account for about 15 percent of the increase in economy-wide earn-
ings volatility.
The explanatory power of the other mechanisms is uniformly small, con-
firming that pure composition effects, such as changes in the distribution of
education or occupation, explain almost none of the change in economy-wide
earnings volatility. Recall that previous theories of rising economy-wide earn-
ings volatility predict shifts toward zero in the distribution of firm or occupa-
tion tenure. If low-tenure workers have higher earnings volatility, then these
shifts could explain increasing economy-wide volatility. But in the uncondi-
tional decompositions, the tenure variables more often predict decreases than
increases in economy-wide earnings volatility.
To more directly test whether job change is responsible for rising economy-
wide earnings volatility, I also measure the total explanatory power of indi-
cators of voluntary and involuntary job change at any point during the nine-
year earnings volatility window.3 Table 4.2 shows that job changers experi-
ence much higher earnings volatility than job stayers, but the results in Table
2It may be that the natural rate of unemployment has declined over time, so that the effect
on earnings volatility of 7 percent unemployment today is similar to the effect of, say, 9 percent
unemployment in the 1970s. In unreported results, I associate the business cycle mechanism
with a detrended unemployment rate instead of the level of the unemployment rate. When
this is done, the predicted negative effect of the unemployment rate on the change in economy-
wide earnings volatility becomes much smaller.
3Job changes due to establishment closing or layoff are assumed to be involuntary. All other
job changes are labeled voluntary. Workers with both voluntary and involuntary job changes
during the window are assigned to the involuntary job change group.
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Table 5.2: Unconditional decompositions of change in economy-wide earnings
volatility from 1975 to 2005, based on OLS regressions
Time-invariant coef. Smoothly varying coef.
Percent Percent
Mechanism ∆ˆm explained ∆ˆm explained
Demand shock index 0.0115 42.5 0.0124 45.5
Education 0.0006 2.2 −0.0011 −4.0
Experience 0.0003 1.1 −0.0004 −1.6
Unemployment rate −0.0046 −16.9 −0.0091 −33.5
Married 0.0041 15.0 0.0035 13.0
Union membership 0.0002 0.7 0.0002 0.8
Occupation −0.0001 −0.5 −0.0013 −4.7
Industry −0.0000 −0.2 −0.0005 −1.7
Employer tenure 0.0006 2.1 −0.0000 −0.0
Occupation tenure −0.0013 −4.8 −0.0013 −4.7
Industry tenure −0.0008 −2.9 −0.0008 −2.9
Job change −0.0003 −1.0 −0.0003 −1.0
Notes: Each row represents one decomposition. ∆ˆm is the change in economy-wide earnings volatility attributable to
changes in the explanatory variables associated with the mechanism in the first column, computed according to
equation (5.4). Decompositions with time-invariant coefficients are based on the regression (5.1) without other
mechanisms and using the coefficient specification (5.2). Decompositions with smoothly varying coefficients are
based on the regression (5.1) without other mechansisms and using the coefficient specification (5.3). Percent
explained is the ratio of ∆ˆm to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005, which is
0.0272. See text for a description of the explanatory variables associated with each mechanism.
5.2 show that job change cannot explain any of the increase in economy-wide
earnings volatility, because the incidence of job change was roughly constant
over time in this sample (see the summary statistics in Table 3.1).
Table 5.3 presents the results of unconditional decompositions based on
regressions with worker fixed effects. Demand shocks about 60 percent of the
increase in economy-wide earnings volatility. The tenure measures do tend
to make positive contributions, but never explain more than 15 percent of the
change. Changes in the occupation and industry distributions make negative
contributions to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility.
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Table 5.3: Unconditional decompositions of change in economy-wide earnings
volatility from 1975 to 2005, based on fixed effects regressions
Time-invariant coef. Smoothly varying coef.
Percent Percent
Mechanism ∆ˆm explained ∆ˆm explained
Demand shock index 0.0157 57.7 0.0178 65.6
Unemployment rate 0.0010 3.8 −0.0017 −6.4
Married 0.0028 10.5 0.0019 6.9
Union membership 0.0014 5.1 0.0013 4.8
Occupation −0.0023 −8.3 −0.0033 −12.3
Industry −0.0027 −9.8 −0.0040 −14.6
Employer tenure −0.0003 −1.0 0.0041 15.0
Occupation tenure 0.0013 4.9 0.0019 7.1
Industry tenure 0.0018 6.6 0.0015 5.5
Job change −0.0002 −0.8 −0.0002 −0.9
Notes: Each row represents one decomposition. ∆ˆm is the change in economy-wide earnings volatility attributable to
changes in the explanatory variables associated with the mechanism in the first column, computed according to
equation (5.4). Decompositions with time-invariant coefficients are based on the regression (5.7) without other
mechanisms and using the coefficient specification (5.2). Decompositions with smoothly varying coefficients are
based on the regression (5.7) without other mechansisms and using the coefficient specification (5.3). Percent
explained is the ratio of ∆ˆm to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005, which is
0.0272. See text for a description of the explanatory variables associated with each mechanism.
5.4.2 Regressions
Table 5.4 assesses the robustness of the relationship between earnings volatility
and demand shocks as various controls are added. Columns 1 and 2 show
the unconditional relationship without and with year indicators, respectively.
The specification in column 2 corresponds to the demand shock unconditional
decomposition with time-invariant coefficients in Table 5.2. Column 3 adds
the worker’s education category, potential experience, and a quadratic in the
unemployment rate, and column 4 includes all of the mechanisms listed in
Table 5.1. In all specifications, the association between earnings volatility and
labor demand shocks is statistically significant, although the estimate becomes
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noisier as controls are added. Table 5.5 presents the same specifications for
models with worker fixed effects. The coefficients on the demand shock index
are very similar for the OLS and fixed effects results. The economic significance
of these results are the subject of the conditional decompositions discussed
below.
Because the demand shock index varies at the education-state-year level
and because disturbances at the level of education-state demographic groups
are likely to be serially correlated, standard errors are clustered on education-
state categories. A further concern is serial correlation of worker-specific unob-
servables, so I also cluster on workers, using the method of Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller (2011) to implement multiway clustering.4
One concern about the regression results is the fact that for many obser-
vations, the nine-year earnings volatility windows overlap. Because the de-
pendent variable and some of the explanatory variables, such as the demand
shock index and the unemployment rate, are measured over the nine-year win-
dow, the results in Table 5.4 may overstate the precision of the point estimates,
even after clustering on workers. To explore the contribution of this false pre-
cision to my results in Table 5.4, I perform the same regressions using only
earnings volatility observations for windows centered on 1975, 1985, 1995, and
2005. This prevents any two observations from using overlapping nine-year
windows.
This conservative approach underestimates the precision of the point esti-
mates by throwing out too much data. First, it excludes workers whose only
earnings volatility observations are in years other than the four selected years,
such as a worker in the earnings sample only from 1987 to 1997, with volatility
4These two group levels—demographic groups and workers—are not nested because work-
ers may change demographic groups over time by moving to another state.
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Table 5.4: Earnings volatility regressions without worker fixed effects
Dependent variable: earnings volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand shock index 4.596∗∗∗ 4.723∗∗ 7.279∗∗∗ 6.598∗∗
(1.046) (1.922) (2.807) (3.252)
Educ: Some college −0.006∗ 0.001
(0.004) (0.005)
Educ: College or more −0.014∗∗ 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Experience −0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean u.e. rate 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.013)
Mean u.e. rate sq. −0.001 −0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Married −0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Union 0.003
(0.017)
Employer tenure −0.001∗∗
(0.001)
Occ. tenure −0.001
(0.000)
Ind. tenure 0.001
(0.001)
Year indicators yes yes yes
Occ. and ind. indicators yes
R2 0.006 0.010 0.013 0.031
Observations 9479 9479 9479 9479
Notes: See text for descriptions of the explanatory variables. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on
education-state groups and on workers. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5.5: Earnings volatility regressions with worker fixed effects
Dependent variable: earnings volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand shock index 4.036∗∗∗ 6.417∗∗ 6.373∗∗ 6.586∗∗
(1.102) (2.921) (2.939) (2.805)
Mean u.e. rate 0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.009)
Mean u.e. rate sq. −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Married −0.015∗∗∗
(0.005)
Union −0.015
(0.017)
Employer tenure 0.000
(0.000)
Occ. tenure −0.000
(0.001)
Ind. tenure 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Year indicators yes yes yes
Occ. and ind. indicators yes
R2 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.021
Observations 9210 9210 9210 9210
Notes: See text for descriptions of the explanatory variables. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on
education-state groups and on workers. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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observations in 1991 and 1993. Second, it excludes information from workers
whose initial or final earnings volatility observations do not fall in one of the
four selected years. For example, consider a worker in the earnings sample
from 1977 to 1995, with earnings volatility observations every two years from
1981 to 1991. Only the 1985 earnings volatility observation, which captures
the relationship between earnings variation and covariates during 1981–1989,
is included in this limited sample. Information on the relationship between
earnings variation and covariates for 1977–1979 and 1991–1995 is excluded.
The results for the non-overlapping subsample are shown in Table 5.6. The
effect of demand shocks on earnings volatility remains statistically significant
in each specification. There are not enough lengthy worker panels to perform
a similar exercise with worker fixed effects.
5.4.3 Conditional decompositions
Table 5.7 shows the results of two conditional decompositions of the change in
economy-wide earnings volatility over the sample period, using the full set of
mechanisms. One decomposition uses the time-invariant coefficients reported
in Table 5.4, column 4, and the other decomposition allows coefficients to vary
over time along a quadratic path (equation (5.3)). Each of the two decom-
position approaches provides an answer to the following question: Given the
relationship between earnings volatility and mechanism m after holding the
other mechanisms constant, how much of the increase in economy-wide earn-
ings volatility over the sample period can be explained by mechanism m?
Demand shocks remain a strong explanation for the increase in economy-
wide earnings volatility after adding the full set of controls. Increasingly vari-
able labor demand accounts for 45 to 60 percent of the rise in economy-wide
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Table 5.6: Earnings volatility regressions without worker fixed effects, non-
overlapping sample
Dependent variable: earnings volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand shock index 4.144∗∗∗ 5.169∗ 9.612∗∗ 8.884∗∗
(1.279) (2.842) (3.967) (4.105)
Educ: Some college −0.008 0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Educ: College or more −0.023∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.007) (0.008)
Experience −0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Mean u.e. rate 0.005 0.006
(0.011) (0.011)
Mean u.e. rate sq. −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Married −0.004
(0.006)
Union 0.002
(0.006)
Employer tenure −0.001∗∗
(0.000)
Occ. tenure −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Ind. tenure 0.001
(0.001)
Year indicators yes yes yes
Occ. and ind. indicators yes
R2 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.043
Observations 2362 2362 2362 2362
Notes: Only observations from year 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 are included, so that the nine-year earnings volatility
windows associated with each observation do not overlap for any observation in this sample. See text for
descriptions of the explanatory variables. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on education-state
groups and on workers. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5.7: Conditional decompositions of change in economy-wide earnings
volatility from 1975 to 2005, based on OLS regressions
Time-invariant coef. Smoothly varying coef.
Percent Percent
Mechanism ∆ˆm explained ∆ˆm explained
Demand shock index 0.0161 59.3 0.0125 45.8
Education 0.0002 0.7 −0.0030 −11.2
Experience −0.0003 −0.9 0.0000 0.0
Unemployment rate −0.0044 −16.2 −0.0061 −22.3
Married 0.0035 12.9 0.0031 11.4
Union membership −0.0004 −1.4 −0.0003 −0.9
Occupation −0.0014 −5.1 −0.0025 −9.1
Industry −0.0004 −1.5 −0.0008 −3.0
Employer tenure 0.0005 2.0 −0.0007 −2.4
Occupation tenure −0.0007 −2.4 −0.0008 −3.0
Industry tenure 0.0004 1.6 0.0004 1.6
Total 0.0133 49.0 0.0019 6.8
Notes: ∆ˆm is the change in economy-wide earnings volatility attributable to changes in the explanatory variables
associated with the mechanism in the first column, computed according to equation (5.4). The decomposition with
time-invariant coefficients is based on the regression (5.1) with the coefficient specification (5.2). The decomposition
with smoothly varying coefficients is based on the regression (5.1) with the coefficient specification (5.3). Percent
explained is the ratio of ∆ˆm to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005, which is
0.0272. See text for a description of the explanatory variables associated with each mechanism.
earnings volatility, depending on the specification. The decline in the unem-
ployment rate over time predicts a modest decrease in economy-wide earnings
volatility.5 Change in marriage can account for about 12 percent of the increase
in economy-wide earnings volatility.
As in the unconditional decompositions, the explanatory power of the other
5As discussed in footnote 2 above, it may be appropriate to detrend the unemployment
rate to account for an apparent secular decline in the natural rate of unemployment. The key
issue is whether earnings volatility should vary with the level of the unemployment rate or
with the position of the unemployment rate relative to its natural level. In unreported results,
I repeat the regressions and conditional decompositions using the detrended unemployment
rate instead of the level of the unemployment rate. The predicted negative effect of the unem-
ployment rate on the change in economy-wide earnings volatility becomes much smaller, and
the explanatory power of the demand shock index changes very little.
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Table 5.8: Conditional decompositions of change in economy-wide earnings
volatility from 1975 to 2005, based on fixed effects regressions
Time-invariant coef. Smoothly varying coef.
Percent Percent
Mechanism ∆ˆm explained ∆ˆm explained
Demand shock index 0.0161 59.2 0.0106 38.8
Unemployment rate 0.0011 4.1 −0.0022 −7.9
Married 0.0028 10.4 0.0014 5.3
Union membership 0.0021 7.6 0.0014 5.2
Occupation −0.0019 −7.0 −0.0037 −13.6
Industry −0.0023 −8.3 −0.0034 −12.4
Employer tenure −0.0000 −0.1 0.0006 2.1
Occupation tenure −0.0005 −1.7 −0.0002 −0.6
Industry tenure 0.0019 7.0 0.0019 6.9
Total 0.0194 71.2 0.0065 24.0
Notes: ∆ˆm is the change in economy-wide earnings volatility attributable to changes in the explanatory variables
associated with the mechanism in the first column, computed according to equation (5.4). The decomposition with
time-invariant coefficients is based on the regression (5.7) with the coefficient specification (5.2). The decomposition
with smoothly varying coefficients is based on the regression (5.7) with the coefficient specification (5.3). Percent
explained is the ratio of ∆ˆm to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005, which is
0.0272. See text for a description of the explanatory variables associated with each mechanism.
mechanisms tends to be quite small. The estimated contribution of job change
or occupation or industry mobility, as measured by the effect of the tenure
variables, is close to zero in both specifications.
Table 5.8 shows the results of conditional decompositions based on worker
fixed effect models. The explanatory power of labor demand shocks remains
high, explaining 40 to 60 percent of the increase in economy-wide earnings
volatility. Changes in the occupation and industry distributions predict de-
creases in economy-wide earnings volatility, and the explanatory power of the
tenure variables, taken together, remains small.
Figure 5.1 provides a way of viewing the contribution of labor demand
shocks to the change in economy-wide earnings volatility over the sample pe-
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riod. The solid line is the cumulative change in economy-wide earnings volatil-
ity since 1975. The dotted line is the cumulative change in economy-wide earn-
ings volatility that is attributed to demand shocks by the decomposition. That
is, denoting the position on the x-axis by τ and using the notation defined in
section 5.2 above, the solid line plots Vτ − V1975, and the dotted line shows
δˆm1975,1977 + · · · + δˆmτ−2,τ. The figure uses the conditional regression results in
Table 5.4, column (4). Labor demand shocks explained all of the increase
in economy-wide earnings volatility as late as the mid-1990s, but since then
economy-wide earnings volatility has risen while the demand shock index has
fallen.
Figure 5.2 shows the same exercises for each of the other mechanisms. The
decomposition results in Table 5.7—which show little explanatory power for
most of the mechanisms—do not hide any large, offsetting contributions dur-
ing the sample period. Most of the negative contribution of the unemployment
rate is concentrated in the last decade of the sample.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 repeat these graphical exercises for decompositions
based on fixed effects regressions, specifically the results in Table 5.5, column
(4). Again, labor demand shocks explained all of the increase in economy-wide
earnings volatility until the last decade of the sample period, when the index of
labor demand shocks declined. The other mechanisms have little explanatory
power throughout the sample period.
5.4.4 Role of job change
Job change does not appear to explain much of the change in economy-wide
earnings volatility, as discussed above in the section on unconditional decom-
positions. But, it may be that demand shocks affect earnings volatility only
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Figure 5.1: Contribution of labor demand shocks to change in economy-wide
earnings volatility in decompositions based on OLS regressions
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Notes: Solid line is cumulative change in economy-wide earnings volatility since 1975.
Dotted line is cumulative contribution of labor demand shocks to this change, calcu-
lated by summing contributions of demand shocks in each decomposition of two-year
change in economy-wide earnings volatility from 1975 to indicated year; see equation
(5.4). Based on results in Table 5.4, column (4).
upon job change, in which case the consequences of job change could explain
the rise in economy-wide earnings volatility even if rates of job change did
not increase. Also, it may be that demand shocks have tended to increase the
rate of job change even though other factors have worked in the opposite di-
rection, keeping total job change rates fairly constant. Either possibility would
be support for existing theories of rising economy-wide earnings volatility, as
discussed in the introduction. In this section I explore the extent to which
job change mediates the relationship between demand shocks and earnings
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Figure 5.2: Contribution of various mechanisms to change in economy-wide
earnings volatility in decompositions based on OLS regressions
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Notes: Solid line is cumulative change in economy-wide earnings volatility since 1975.
Dotted line is cumulative contribution of indicated mechanism to this change, cal-
culated by summing contributions of mechanism in each decomposition of two-year
change in economy-wide earnings volatility from 1975 to indicated year; see equation
(5.4). Based on results in Table 5.4, column (4).
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Figure 5.3: Contribution of labor demand shocks to change in economy-wide
earnings volatility in decompositions based on fixed effects regressions
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Notes: Solid line is cumulative change in economy-wide earnings volatility since 1975.
Dotted line is cumulative contribution of labor demand shocks to this change, calcu-
lated by summing contributions of demand shocks in each decomposition of two-year
change in economy-wide earnings volatility from 1975 to indicated year; see equation
(5.4). Based on results in Table 5.5, column (4).
volatility.
First, I ask whether the effect of demand shocks on earnings volatility is
larger among job changers than among job stayers. The first two columns of
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the results for regressions without and with worker
fixed effects, respectively. Though the coefficients are somewhat imprecisely
estimated compared to the earlier regression results, the overall story seems to
be that demand shocks are positively associated with earnings volatility among
job stayers, and the association is about 50 percent larger among job changers.
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Figure 5.4: Contribution of various mechanisms to change in economy-wide
earnings volatility in decompositions based on fixed effects regressions
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Notes: Solid line is cumulative change in economy-wide earnings volatility since 1975.
Dotted line is cumulative contribution of indicated mechanism to this change, cal-
culated by summing contributions of mechanism in each decomposition of two-year
change in economy-wide earnings volatility from 1975 to indicated year; see equation
(5.4). Based on results in Table 5.5, column (4).
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Table 5.9: Role of job change in the relationship between labor demand shocks
and earnings volatility, regressions without worker fixed effects
Dep. var.: earnings volatility Dep. var.: job change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand shock index 2.979 5.663 19.352 3.743
(2.782) (4.123) (94.009) (64.350)
Demand shocks × job change 1.835 1.598
(2.786) (3.756)
Job change 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.009) (0.018)
Year indicators yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes
R2 0.055 0.067 0.010 0.225
Observations 9479 9479 9479 9479
Notes: Job change variable is an indicator of any job change during the nine-year window used to measure earnings
volatility. Controls are education categories, potential experience, unemployment rate, marriage, union membership,
employer tenure, occupation tenure, industry tenure, and occupation and industry indicators. See Table 5.1 for
details. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on education-state groups and on workers. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
It is not the case that demand shocks affect earnings volatility entirely through
job change.
The final two columns of Tables 5.9 and 5.10 address the extent to which
demand shocks affect the probability of job change over the nine-year volatility
window, using linear probability models. On average 47 percent of workers
change jobs during a nine-year window. In OLS specifications, the estimates
indicate that a one standard deviation increase (0.0018) in the demand shock in-
dex raises the probability of job change by 0.7 to 3.5 percentage points. In fixed
effects specifications, the same increase in the demand shock index decreases
the probability of job change by 0.1 to 0.8 percentage points. None of these
estimates are statistically significantly different from zero. The demand shock
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Table 5.10: Role of job change in the relationship between labor demand shocks
and earnings volatility, regressions with worker fixed effects
Dep. var.: earnings volatility Dep. var.: job change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demand shock index 5.392∗ 5.079 −4.612 −0.674
(3.198) (3.098) (8.702) (8.604)
Demand shocks × job change 2.411 3.083
(2.293) (2.255)
Job change 0.029∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Year indicators yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes
R2 0.036 0.047 0.078 0.117
Observations 9210 9210 9210 9210
Notes: Job change variable is an indicator of any job change during the nine-year window used to measure earnings
volatility. Controls are unemployment rate, marriage, union membership, employer tenure, occupation tenure,
industry tenure, and occupation and industry indicators. See Table 5.1 for details. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered on education-state groups and on workers. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
index increased by 0.0024 between 1975 and 2005. Assuming that this increased
the probability of job change by 4.6 percentage points (= 0.0024× 19.352, the
largest estimated coefficient), and multiplying by the unconditional difference
in mean earnings volatility between job changers and job stayers (0.047), the
higher rates of job change caused by demand shocks predict an increase of
0.0022 in economy-wide earnings volatility, less than one tenth of the actual
increase of 0.0272.
5.4.5 Robustness checks
In this section I explore the robustness of my primary finding, that labor de-
mand shocks explain about half the increase in economy-wide earnings volatil-
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ity, to alternative constructions of the demand shock index. I consider three
choices made in defining this index, and show results for each of the eight
possible combinations of these choices.
First, consider the definition of the worker’s labor market. In the results
discussed above, labor markets are defined by demographic groups, and these
groups are affected differently by national changes in the occupation-industry
employment distribution. Among the advantages of this labor market clas-
sification is that it recognizes that the sector demand shifts may create local
labor market spillovers. For example, service workers may be more affected
by a broad negative demand shock to the manufacturing industry in areas
where manufacturing employment is relatively high, both because manufac-
turing workers may shift to lower-skill occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2009)
and because the demand of manufacturing workers for services decreases.
Nevertheless, it may be that a better indicator of the worker’s labor mar-
ket is the occupation-industry sector in which the worker is employed, in
which case the demand shock index is simply the variability of demand in the
worker’s sector. A disadvantage of this classification is that workers change oc-
cupation and industry somewhat frequently, and presumably at least partially
on a forward-looking basis.6 This creates endogeneity concerns when using
occupation-industry sector demand shifts directly to explain earnings volatil-
ity, because the sector choice influences both earnings volatility (for example,
from searching for a good job within the new sector) and the demand shock in-
dex (which would be sector-specific). Another disadvantage of this approach is
that occupation and industry classifications likely contain more measurement
6For the 1980s, Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2011) find that about 3 percent of men move to
another state each year. Kambourov and Manovskii (2008) estimate that the annual incidence
among males of one-digit occupation change and one-digit industry change is roughly 15
percent and 12 percent, respectively; the incidence of occupation or industry change would
therefore be greater than 15 percent.
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error than education and state categories.
A second choice made in the construction of the demand shock index is
to use log hours as the measure of sector labor demands. An alternative is
to use the sector’s share of all hours worked within the year. This relative
demand measure would be unchanged by shifts in the population growth rate,
but would also mask any macroeconomic shocks that affect all sectors equally.
The third choice I consider is whether to detrend the measure of sector de-
mand before computing the variability of demand in that sector. In the results
above, the sector demands are not detrended before constructing the demand
shock index. An alternative is to remove a linear trend in demand specific
to each sector, so that long-term shifts in the sector employment mix do not
contribute to observed labor demand shocks. For example, there has been
a decades-long movement of employment toward skilled occupations domi-
nated by highly educated workers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Arguably, this
shift is eventually built into workers’ expectations of the future, and should
be reflected in life cycle earnings profiles—through worker fixed effects and
perhaps heterogeneous trends—rather than in volatility of residual earnings.
On the other hand, such trends are rarely permanent (on the recent slowdown
in relative demand shifts favoring highly skilled workers, see Beaudry, Green,
and Sand (2013)), and detrending the sector demands may overstate the extent
to which workers expected the trends. Overall, I do not see a clear case for
strongly preferring one of these choices—detrending the sector demands, or
not—over the other.
Table 5.11 shows that the association between earnings volatility and labor
demand shocks in OLS estimates is quite robust to using other constructions
of the demand shock index. For each of the alternative constructions of the
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index, the table shows the coefficient on the demand shock index in both un-
conditional and conditional regressions. (The estimates in the first row repeat
those in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5.4.) The labor demand shock index has
the expected sign in all specifications and is statistically significant in most
specifications. Table 5.12 repeats the robustness checks for models with worker
fixed effects. Again, the labor demand shock index is statistically significant in
most specifications. Table 5.13 shows OLS estimates using the non-overlapping
subsample described above. Some of the estimates are much noisier than the
full sample results in Table 5.11, but all are of the hypothesized sign and most
are statistically significant.
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show robustness of the decomposition results to the
various constructions of the demand shock index. For each construction of the
index, the tables show the percent of the increase in economy-wide earnings
volatility that is explained by demand shocks in the conditional decomposi-
tions which include all explanatory variables in Table 5.1. Table 5.14 shows
results in which the underlying regressions are estimated using OLS, and Ta-
ble 5.15 shows results in which the underlying regressions are estimated using
worker fixed effects. The percent change in economy-wide earnings volatility
explained by demand shocks varies between 20 percent and 80 percent.
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Table 5.11: Coefficient on demand shock index in earnings volatility regressions
for various constructions of demand shock index, OLS regressions
Demand shock index construction Regression with
Labor market Demand measure Detrended
Regression with year indicators
year indicators and controls
demographic log hours no 4.723∗∗ 6.598∗∗
(1.922) (3.252)
demographic log hours yes 4.531 3.586
(3.130) (4.575)
demographic emp. share no 0.985∗∗∗ 3.582∗∗∗
(0.334) (1.142)
demographic emp. share yes 7.564∗∗∗ 15.729∗∗
(2.505) (7.966)
sector log hours no 4.082∗∗ 4.529∗∗
(1.653) (2.009)
sector log hours yes 4.190∗ 4.532∗
(2.494) (2.721)
sector emp. share no 1.921 2.748
(1.467) (2.300)
sector emp. share yes 8.071∗ 8.810∗
(4.213) (5.335)
Notes: Each result is the estimated coefficient on the demand shock index in an earnings volatility regression, where
the construction of the index is described by the first three columns: whether education-state demographic groups or
occupation-industry sectors are taken to be the appropriate labor markets, whether log hours or economy-wide
employment share is taken to measure a sector’s demand, and whether the sector’s demand is detrended before the
demand shock index is measured. See text for further details. Controls in the rightmost column are education
categories, potential experience, unemployment rate, marriage, union membership, employer tenure, occupation
tenure, industry tenure, and occupation and industry indicators. See Table 5.1 for details. Robust standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered on workers and on labor markets: education-state groups when demographic groups
represent labor markets, and occupation-industry groups when sectors represent labor markets.
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Table 5.12: Coefficient on demand shock index in earnings volatility regressions
for various constructions of demand shock index, fixed effects regressions
Demand shock index construction Regression with
Labor market Demand measure Detrended
Regression with year indicators
year indicators and controls
demographic log hours no 6.417∗∗ 6.586∗∗
(2.921) (2.805)
demographic log hours yes 6.247 6.659
(4.244) (4.131)
demographic emp. share no 1.465 1.643∗
(0.957) (0.927)
demographic emp. share yes 6.413∗ 6.618∗
(3.801) (3.567)
sector log hours no 4.883∗∗ 4.853∗∗
(1.958) (1.957)
sector log hours yes 5.469∗∗ 5.422∗∗
(2.636) (2.629)
sector emp. share no 2.293 2.206
(1.457) (1.395)
sector emp. share yes 6.406∗∗ 6.183∗∗
(3.103) (2.786)
Notes: Each result is the estimated coefficient on the demand shock index in an earnings volatility regression, where
the construction of the index is described by the first three columns: whether education-state demographic groups or
occupation-industry sectors are taken to be the appropriate labor markets, whether log hours or economy-wide
employment share is taken to measure a sector’s demand, and whether the sector’s demand is detrended before the
demand shock index is measured. See text for further details. Controls in the rightmost column are unemployment
rate, marriage, union membership, employer tenure, occupation tenure, industry tenure, and occupation and
industry indicators. See Table 5.1 for details. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on workers and on
labor markets: education-state groups when demographic groups represent labor markets, and occupation-industry
groups when sectors represent labor markets.
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Table 5.13: Coefficient on demand shock index in earnings volatility regres-
sions for various constructions of demand shock index, OLS regressions, non-
overlapping sample
Demand shock index construction Regression with
Labor market Demand measure Detrended
Regression with year indicators
year indicators and controls
demographic log hours no 5.169∗ 8.884∗∗
(2.842) (4.105)
demographic log hours yes 7.492 7.047
(6.377) (7.105)
demographic emp. share no 3.192∗∗∗ 4.670∗∗∗
(1.230) (1.786)
demographic emp. share yes 8.453 15.432
(14.019) (18.574)
sector log hours no 5.006∗∗∗ 5.679∗∗∗
(1.700) (1.838)
sector log hours yes 5.022∗∗ 5.525∗∗
(2.281) (2.332)
sector emp. share no 3.130∗ 3.728∗∗
(1.815) (1.855)
sector emp. share yes 8.386∗∗∗ 8.285∗∗∗
(2.442) (2.272)
Notes: Only observations from year 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 are included, so that the nine-year earnings volatility
windows associated with each observation do not overlap for any observation in this sample. Each result is the
estimated coefficient on the demand shock index in an earnings volatility regression, where the construction of the
index is described by the first three columns: whether education-state demographic groups or occupation-industry
sectors are taken to be the appropriate labor markets, whether log hours or economy-wide employment share is
taken to measure a sector’s demand, and whether the sector’s demand is detrended before the demand shock index
is measured. See text for further details. Controls in the rightmost column are education categories, potential
experience, unemployment rate, marriage, union membership, employer tenure, occupation tenure, industry tenure,
and occupation and industry indicators. See Table 5.1 for details. Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered on workers and on labor markets: education-state groups when demographic groups represent labor
markets, and occupation-industry groups when sectors represent labor markets.
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Table 5.14: Percent of change in economy-wide earnings volatility explained by
demand shocks, for various constructions of demand shock index, in decom-
positions based on OLS regressions
Demand shock index construction Time- Smoothly
Labor market Demand measure Detrended
invariant varying
coefficients coefficients
demographic log hours no 59.3 45.8
demographic log hours yes 38.8 19.6
demographic emp. share no 44.3 60.8
demographic emp. share yes 81.4 66.8
sector log hours no 55.3 53.2
sector log hours yes 61.0 68.3
sector emp. share no 36.2 44.6
sector emp. share yes 43.1 39.4
Notes: Each result is the percentage of the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005 that is
explained by an index of labor demand shocks, where the construction of the index is described by the first three
columns: whether education-state demographic groups or occupation-industry sectors are taken to be the
appropriate labor markets, whether log hours or economy-wide employment share is taken to measure a sector’s
demand, and whether the sector’s demand is detrended before the demand shock index is measured. See text for
further details. The results come from conditional decompositions similar to those in Table 5.7, and include all the
controls listed in that table.
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Table 5.15: Percent of change in economy-wide earnings volatility explained by
demand shocks, for various constructions of demand shock index, in decom-
positions based on fixed effects regressions
Demand shock index construction Time- Smoothly
Labor market Demand measure Detrended
invariant varying
coefficients coefficients
demographic log hours no 59.2 38.8
demographic log hours yes 72.0 81.9
demographic emp. share no 20.3 18.3
demographic emp. share yes 34.3 36.8
sector log hours no 59.3 55.3
sector log hours yes 73.0 73.9
sector emp. share no 29.1 41.6
sector emp. share yes 30.3 29.2
Notes: Each result is the percentage of the change in economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005 that is
explained by an index of labor demand shocks, where the construction of the index is described by the first three
columns: whether education-state demographic groups or occupation-industry sectors are taken to be the
appropriate labor markets, whether log hours or economy-wide employment share is taken to measure a sector’s
demand, and whether the sector’s demand is detrended before the demand shock index is measured. See text for
further details. The results come from conditional decompositions similar to those in Table 5.8, and include all the
controls listed in that table.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The literature on earnings volatility contains an array of terminology, mea-
sures, and conclusions. The first part of this dissertation provides some clarity.
I identify conceptual differences among previous measures of earnings volatil-
ity, then make some methodological recommendations to guide measurement
in future studies, based on the fact that potential welfare losses are the primary
motivation for studying earnings volatility.
I show that, by my preferred measure, economy-wide earnings volatility
has increased among men in the U.S. since the 1970s. This phenomenon
has presented a puzzle for labor economists since it was first documented
by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), and the increase has continued since then.
The empirical part of this dissertation is the first to attempt to solve that puz-
zle using worker-level data and the first to analyze multiple potential reasons
for increasing economy-wide earnings volatility. I develop decomposition ap-
proaches to quantify the extent to which various mechanisms can account for
the increase in economy-wide earnings volatility over time.
I construct a demand shock index to capture the labor market demand shifts
to which workers are exposed through national changes in the occupation-
industry mix of hours worked. The relationship between earnings volatility
and demand shocks is strong both unconditionally and after adding numerous
controls, and is robust to many alternative constructions of the demand shock
index. I find that labor demand shocks explain about half of the increase in
economy-wide earnings volatility between 1975 and 2005.
Worker and job characteristics explain close to none of the change in economy-
wide earnings volatility. This shows that rising economy-wide earnings volatil-
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ity is not attributable to salient labor market trends, such as the decline of
unions and the increase in the proportion of workers with a college degree.
I also test previous explanations for rising economy-wide earnings volatility,
which focus more frequent job, occupation, or industry switches, and find that
these things cannot explain increasing economy-wide earnings volatility.
The literature on labor market risk often focuses on job change. Hallock
(2009), for example, identifies a decrease in job duration among men, and Kam-
bourov and Manovskii (2008) show that occupation and industry mobility have
increased. In this paper, I find that larger or more frequent demand shocks
have caused higher earnings volatility upon job change, but I also find that
these shocks pass through to job stayers. This suggests a substantial change
in the implicit contract governing employment relationships, an additional di-
mension of increasing labor market risk that deserves further study.
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